

The University of Chicago

THE REPUBLICAN EXPANSIONISTS
OF THE EARLY RECONSTRUC-
TION ERA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
GRADUATE FACULTY IN CANDIDACY FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
1930

By
JOE PATTERSON SMITH

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1933

The University of Chicago

THE REPUBLICAN EXPANSIONISTS
OF THE EARLY RECONSTRUCTION ERA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
GRADUATE FACULTY IN CANDIDACY FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1930

By

JOE PATTERSON SMITH

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

1933



Preface.

The study projected herein may well be termed a footnote to the history of the Reconstruction Era. Essentially it is an attempt to analyze one of the currents which though important during the period never gained sufficient impetus to become an issue. It is the study of curious and half-groping attempts at expansion which had as their goal the incorporation of British North America with the United States; but culminated with the purchase of Alaska. Intrinsically, then, it is an analysis of a 'might-have-been' of history. What little value it has, lies, I think, in the fact that it sheds a curious light on the activities of the radical minority of the Republican party, which kept the movement alive and used it to further its political fortunes.

The materials for the study have been drawn, for the most part, from manuscript sources. I have attempted carefully to evaluate the facts gleaned from these sources and to correlate them with those gained from other sources which have been available for a long time to the student of this era. Many manuscript collections, which, I think, would shed additional light on the movement are not yet open to the student. Notable amongst these are the correspondence and diaries of Alexander H. Ramsey of Minnesota and the papers of N. P. Banks of Massachusetts. Earnest efforts which I made to secure permission to use these manuscripts came to naught. I am, however, deeply indebted to the custodians of the manuscript collections which were put at my disposal. As previous acknowledgement of my debt to these custodians has been made, any repetition here would be out of

place. I am indebted likewise to friends in Canada and to many in the United States for thoughtful assistance cheerfully rendered me.

THE REPUBLICAN EXPANSIONISTS OF THE EARLY RECONSTRUCTION ERA.

INTRODUCTION

The notion that the United States should expand northward had its inception with the birth of the Republic. During the late summer of 1775 the Second Continental Congress authorized General Montgomery and Benedict Arnold to lead a military expedition against Montreal and Quebec in the hope that a fourteenth colony might be added to the thirteen already in rebellion against the authority of Great Britain. On the last day of the year Montgomery and Arnold failed when their depleted forces were repulsed at Quebec. In the following spring, Benjamin Franklin sought to accomplish by diplomacy that which military force had not attained. However, Franklin's persuasive efforts were as unsuccessful as the drive of the patriot generals. These failures, highly important in the War for American Independence, as many commentators testify, were also of significance to the history of American expansion, for they indicated the direction of subsequent attempts to push the boundary of the United States northward. Moreover, during the next century, as the United States expanded westward to the Pacific, and the British Provinces in North America evolved into the Dominion of Canada, intrigue, diplomacy and conquest, attempted or threatened, all directed to the end of absorbing British North America, cut a zig-zag pattern in the web of Anglo-Canadian and American history. In 1782, the Philadelphia Sage of the generation which won independence for the American colonies brought Canada once more into the orbit of political consideration.

At this time, while engaged in negotiating a treaty of peace with His Majesty's plenipotentiary at Passy, Franklin dangled before his eyes a tempting offer of reconciliation with the mother country in exchange for which Canada was to become a part of the United States. Richard Oswald, the British negotiator, was nibbling at this tempting bait, and Canada might then and there have become a part of the new Union had not Jay and Adams, Franklin's colleagues, moved too hastily. Here the efforts of the first generation of independent Americans to absorb a portion of British North America ended.

The next move to incorporate Canada into the United States was of western origin. In December, 1811, the radical wing of the Jeffersonian Republicans swept out of the West, organized Congress, and pushed a reluctant President and an unwilling New England into a war with Great Britain. Their object, of primary concern here, was the capture of the St. Lawrence Valley, though they talked glibly of maritime rights. The St. Lawrence afforded a highway, as they well knew, over which the products of their western farms might be sent into the markets of the world. 'Manifest Destiny' was a guiding principle of these 'War Hawks,' and hatred of everything British a motivating force. Their uncoordinated thrusts at the Canadian frontier brought only costly reverses, with the result that when the war was over, British imperial interests north of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence were more firmly intrenched than before, for the Canadians -- French and English -- had united to defend their homeland.

The unity of the Canadians was short-lived. By the

middle thirties dissatisfaction with the methods employed by the British government in the handling of colonial matters was rife. As Martin Van Buren took up the task of administering the affairs of the American Democracy in the spring of 1837, Papineau and MacKenzie raised the standard of rebellion in Canada and threatened, as border people have throughout the whole of western civilization, to ask for incorporation with their neighbors. The appeal of the Canadian rebels struck a responsive chord south of the frontier and Hunter's Lodges along the whole of the border pressed forward to assist the distressed Canadians. By this time, moreover, it had become the fashion in the United States for leading politicians to indulge in fervent denunciations of Great Britain on the slightest pretext. Hence, it was no abiding affection for England which prompted the President to order a military force to the Canadian frontier to restrain the border folk and maintain neutrality. His action was prompted, it seems more likely, by an awareness that his southern supporters would brook no expansion northward, which when realized might challenge the southern domination of the Republic. Thus while the great masses of the American people were recovering from a devastating panic, the British government scotched the annexation movement, led primarily by Canadians, by timely concessions to colonial demands.

Within a decade the American people, fully recovered from the Panic of 1837, were casting covetous eyes in all directions. An expansionist sentiment which had been growing slowly since the early days of the Jacksonian era was fully developed by the middle forties. Though this sentiment was most pronounced

for extension into the Oregon country and the far Southwest, there is minor evidence to indicate that factions of the body politic would have welcomed expansion northward. However, the politicians most interested in the 're-annexation' of Texas and 'Fifty-four Forty or Fight' dominated the Democratic party which was swept into power in the national canvass of 1844. Once in power, Polk and the 'Manifest Destiny' mob, as Greeley later called them, compromised their quarrel with Great Britain over the territories of the far Northwest in order that they might have free rein to round out the boundaries of the Great Republic in the Sante Fe and California regions. This left the question of extension to the north and northwest for the politicians of another decade.

Meantime, the value of colonial possessions was being questioned in the United Kingdom. Those Britishers who believed that they were no longer justified in spending a large portion of their revenue for the protection of the colonies, without reciprocal colonial expenditures looking to the same end, were in the ascendancy. Free traders, too, in 1846, had brought about the repeal of the Corn Laws which should have benefited the colonies, particularly those in North America, had not the advantage which would have accrued from their repeal been promptly nullified by the repeal of the Navigation Acts. Consequently Canadian economic development languished. By the early fifties the depression was so marked that a considerable party had arisen in Canada which sought adjustment of her economic ills by clamoring for annexation to the United States. The agitation attracted considerable attention south

of the border and flirtatious northern politicians who wished to break the domination of slavocracy in national politics toyed with the notion of incorporating Canada.

As the annexation party in Canada grew and indicated unmistakably that it meant to seek annexation to the United States, Her Majesty's government sent a most able Governor General out to the Canadas to meet the crisis. Lord Elgin, the new governor general, fully aware that the allaying of unrest in the Provinces was contingent upon economic adjustment, and knowing that a reciprocity treaty which would admit provincial products to the markets of the United States free of duty would probably remedy the situation for the Canadas and the other British Provinces, sought such a treaty. The political situation in the United States at this time was such that there were parties which, if skillfully manipulated, were ready to support such a treaty. Secretary of State Marcy believed that reciprocal trade with Canada would be advantageous to the United States. With his assistance, Lord Elgin persuaded the southern and western senators that the peculiar interests which they served would benefit. As a result of his manipulations he secured the ratification of a treaty which, when it went into operation in 1855, speedily brought an end to annexation talk in the Canadas. Again Canadian absorption was averted.

The leaders of the newly rising Republican party, which came into power in 1860, had not been for the most part occupied with national politics during the expansion movements of the three decades prior to their advent to power. Nevertheless, the potency of 'Manifest Destiny' and its appeal to the

voters of a democracy expanding its interests in many fields, was not lost upon them. One of their number, William H. Seward, had witnessed from the vantage point of New York State the Canadian uprising of 1837, the expansive thrusts of the eighteen-forties and the attempt of Canada to annex herself to the United States in the early fifties. The Secretary of State to be was an ardent expansionist. In fact he had been in office less than a month before he recommended to his chief that an aggressive expansionist program be adopted to heal the threatened domestic schism. Charles Sumner, another of the Republican leaders had won recognition in his native state, Massachusetts, and been sent to the Senate for denouncing Polk and his militant democracy. Zachariah Chandler, Republican savant of Michigan, during his boyhood in the Vermont hills had enjoyed an ample opportunity to watch the efforts of Papineau and McKenzie. To lesser men than these, N. P. Banks, B. F. Butler, and James W. Taylor the possibility of annexing Canada was not a new thought and when opportunity offered for adopting such a policy they did not hesitate to assume the traditional democratic program. Before their opportunity came, four fearful years of civil conflict ensued in the United States. During this rebellion, Great Britain's too friendly attitude towards the enemies of the Republic gave the Republicans additional reasons for wishing to seize her territory as a possible revenge. The Republican reaction to these allegedly unfriendly acts and the growth of titantic military power to put down rebellion were the prelude to the movement treated in the following pages.

Chapter I

THE END OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THREATENED CONQUEST OF CANADA

During the summer of 1864, the tension in Anglo-American relations, strained almost to the breaking point during the past three years of civil conflict in the United States, was somewhat eased. British statesmen ceased to toy with the notion either of recognizing the Confederacy or of interfering in its behalf. The tide of hatred which had swept the North when Great Britain extended belligerent rights to the rebels temporarily ebbed. The war-like excitement which had grown out of the 'Trent crisis' had subsided. To be sure, the Yankee press periodically flayed the British aristocracy for the sympathy which it had extended to the southerners. Intermittently as the news of some merchantman sent to the bottom by the Alabama became public property the British government was arraigned for its duplicity in permitting the escape of this and the other confederate 'pirates' from English ports. Too, Perfidious Albion was chided for sundry other acts of which neutrals are usually guilty. These outpourings, however, were but the flotsam and jetsam tossed upon a sea of newsprint when events from the front made dull reading. The real energies of the American people, meanwhile, were marshalled in one supreme array to crush the rebellion, just as a last desperate act of the falling Confederacy brought in its wake an unexpected turn in Anglo-American relations.

The wrench in the relations of the two English-speaking nations grew out of the activities of confederate agents sent

into Canada by Jefferson Davis. One of the commissioners selected to perform the delicate task assigned to him orally by the President of the Confederacy was Jacob M. Thompson.¹ He was a master of political intrigue. In early 1861 he had quit his post in the Buchanan cabinet and gone south further to advance his fortunes and those of the infant Confederacy. Thenceforth his career was a chequered one until in the spring of 1864, when he had either become too meddlesome to suit Jefferson Davis or had shown special qualifications for the mission he was to perform, the southern chief sent Thompson from the Confederacy. Establishing himself with his fellow agent, C. C. Clay, on the neutral ground of Canada, by mid-July 1864 Thompson set vigorously to work. During the next few weeks the confederate commissioners sent co-workers to organize riots in the industrial centers of the North, commissioned adventurers who would emulate the achievements of Captain Semmes by scuttling the commerce carriers of the United States on the Great Lakes and finally, organized, armed and directed bands of confederate sympathizers who were to raid towns and cities in the states adjacent to the Canadian border. Indubitably the Confederates sought in this way to turn the sentiment of the North against Lincoln and the war party. Too, they probably thought that the raids on the frontier towns would be of sufficient magnitude to divert to the new danger point the attention of numbers of the federal army massed in Virginia, so

1. The written instructions given Thompson were constructed so that the Confederacy would be answerable for any acts which his ingenuity might lead him to perpetrate. Davis to Thompson, April 27, 1864, Official Record of the Rebellion, Series IV, III, 322.

that General Lee might gain a decisive victory over the remnant of the northern forces. Finally, hope of hopes, they doubtless visioned the United States and Great Britain embroiled in war over the laxness of the colonial government in the enforcement of neutrality.¹ The designs of the confederate agents were indeed extensive, equally so their failures. The civil disturbances they incited were insignificant. Scuttling American commerce proved more damaging in the concoction than in the execution, while the border raids save that on St. Albans, Vermont were but ephemeral threats.²

Despite the fact that the St. Albans raid was successful as viewed by Bennett H. Young, leader of the confederate banditti, it was of little moment in bringing decision to the war between the states. True, by shooting up the sleepy Vermont village and robbing its banks on October 19, 1864, the raiders threw the press of the northern states into a momentary clamor. But almost as quickly as the outburst arose, interest in the

1. That there was at least gossip in Richmond that this was the hope of the confederate government is borne out by the observations of the 'Rebel War Clerk,' Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, II, 359. Additional information is to be found in a letter obviously from C. C. Clay to his wife. The letter was taken from the messenger bearing it from Montreal to Richmond and sent to the Governor-General of Canada by the U. S. State Department in an effort to identify and apprehend the sender. It is enclosed in: Burnley to Monck, Dec. 21, 1864, G-233, 177 ff.

2. The operations of the Confederates in Canada can be traced most satisfactorily through the reports of C. C. Clay and Jacob M. Thompson to Judah P. Benjamin, scattered through: Official Record, Series IV, III. Callahan's interest in the subject is largely from the point of view of the student of defense. Callahan, J. M., The Northern Frontier during the Civil War, A. H. A. Report, 1896, I, 337 ff. The most recent treatment of the subject is sketchy, lacking in appreciation of the critical problems involved and though obviously based on well known documents contains no citations: Bovey, W., Confederate Agents in Canada during the American Civil War, C. H. R., II, 46 ff.

incident quieted, for as the raiders fled across the border, the provost-marshal at Burlington captured eight of them, the Canadians, four more and the American Secretary of State took steps to recover the latter and their swag. It seemed apparent that justice would be done in due course of time. The press, therefore, focused its attention once more on the absorbing presidential canvass going forward. Young and his associates, in the hands of the Canadian authorities, desired neither trial by a New England jury nor court-martial by the union army. Hence through their counsel, provided by Jacob Thompson and C. C. Clay, they established the claim that they were not subject to extradition because they were confederate belligerents. The Canadian justice trying the case considered the claim admissible and granted continuances in the trial so that the facts of citizenship might be established by documentary evidence to be secured from Richmond. These delays prorogued disposition of the question until mid-December when Justice Coursal dismissed the prisoners for want of jurisdiction.¹

In the interval between the perpetration of the St. Albans raid (October 19th) and the release of the Confederates held by the Canadian authorities (December 13th), the fog of political and military indecision in the United States had lifted. Lincoln's policy of preserving the Union at all costs had been sustained at the November elections. The astute observer real-

1. Official Record, Series I, XLIII, Part II, 420 - 423, 435 - 436 & 455 ff. Nicolay and Hay's account of the raid is clear, accurate and concise; Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, VIII, 23 ff.

ized that Grant's victory over Lee's rapidly dwindling forces was a matter of days -- or at the most -- of weeks. The significance of Sherman's successes in the far South and Sheridan's destruction in the Virginia Valley was apparent even to the members of the lame-duck Congress getting underway in Washington. It was disposing of routine matters much to the dislike of the radical members who pined for a vital issue of which political capital might be made. The press, too, languished for want of sensational news. There had been plenty in the past. But for both, the congressional radicals and the journalists, the decision of the Canadian judge was capable of supplying the deficiency, boding ill for the continuance of amicable Anglo-American relations.¹

Reflecting the changed condition, the press greeted what might be called the after-math of the 'latest rebel outrage' with a salvo of Anglo-phobia. Lest the reader had forgotten the recent acts of hostility committed by John Bull, the papers recapitulated them. From this spring board, the editors then plunged into a superficial exposition of the meaning of Cour-sal's decision. Horace Greeley thought that the act was a covert recognition of the Confederacy, which meant that a state of war existed between Great Britain and the United States?² But

1. After the election of Lincoln, until the events of late December, the editorials in the leading dailies were for the most part concerned with a re-hash of past events. I have seen no editorial which was not friendly to Canada between October 21, and December 13, 1864. There was no speech of any importance in either branch of Congress between its assembling on December 5th and December 14th.

2. The New York Daily Tribune, December 15, 1864.

as an after-thought, he expressed the hope that the government would confine its action to negotiation until it was apparent that the rebellion had been smashed. As though mere war with Great Britain would not satisfy the western population, Joseph Medill seized the occasion to recommend conquest as well. He instructed the Lincoln administration "to march a sufficient body of troops to Montreal, Quebec or any other place where the St. Albans pillagers may have taken refuge" as an earnest that the Great Republic meant to collect its just debts.¹ Thus the editor of the Chicago Tribune injected into the discussion of Anglo-American relations the idea that the auspicious moment for the Republic to realize its 'Manifest Destiny' had arrived. Henceforth he was to be found a towering figure among the apostles of expansion.² In the East expansion had quite as ardent a champion in James Gordon Bennett, the renegade Scot. As editor of the New York Herald, styled by John Bright the 'Ishmaelite organ,' Bennett recommended the conquest of the British North American Provinces as wise employment for the union army soon to be seeking new fields to conquer.³

More fundamental perhaps than the newspaper talk was the direction which the government's policy seemed to be taking.

1. The Chicago Tribune, December 14, 1864.

2. The editorial cited above is the first outburst of expansionist sentiment appearing in the newsprint of this period. From this time forward, expansion into Canada seems to have been a 'Tribune policy.' Medill believed in it personally as his letters to public men which are cited in other connections indicate.

3. Bright to Sumner, Jan. 11, 1865, Sumner Mss., CXXXIX, 7. Editorially throughout the next few years Bennett recommended expansion.

Early in November several thousand troops had been ordered to the Canadian frontier.¹ They were sent ostensibly to lessen the apprehension of further rebel incursions entertained by the border people as well as to prevent the fraudulent voting of any Canadians in the November elections.² These over, the raids no longer threatening and the demands for troops in other quarters daily lessening, the force was conveniently left at its new station. While B. F. Butler, in immediate command of this army, chafed at its inactivity, President Lincoln on November 23rd, perhaps to alleviate anticipated radical pressure, served notice on Her Majesty's government that the United States would no longer adhere to the Rush-Bagot Convention limiting naval armaments on the Lakes. This fact along with others pertinent to the latest phase of misunderstanding with Great Britain became public property on December 6th.³ The public also was aware that during the recent presidential canvass politicians close to the President, such as Montgomery Blair, obviously to win Irish votes, had publicly stated that the outstanding scores with John Bull would be peremptorily

1. J. A. Dix to Edward Stanton, November 4, 1864, Official Record, Series I, XLIII, 543.

2. Ibid., Cf. also General Order No. 1, Nov. 5, 1864, 550 ff.

3. Lincoln in his annual message, devoted considerable space to the discussion of this phase of the foreign policy. More than a third of the message is devoted to foreign affairs. It might be urged that the President was directing the attention of the congressional radicals to these matters over which they would have little control without previous initiatory activity by the executive, so that he might be free to deal with domestic issues.

settled once the rebellion was crushed.¹ True, for other causes, Blair's removal from high position had been forced in late September. But Stanton and Welles whose dislike of Britain if less well known was easily as pronounced as that of the former Postmaster General, remained in the cabinet. At this time Stanton was indifferent to the possibility of war with England. He believed that the British wanted war and he was moreover doing little to prevent its fruition if a letter written by him to General Dix is trustworthy evidence. He informed the commander of the Eastern Military Division: "It is not likely that they (the Canadian authorities) will take any steps towards preserving the peace. You must take your own measures without reference to them."²

Heedless of the circumstances which might grow out of a too literal pursuance of his instructions, General Dix availed himself of the first opportunity to use the carte blanche given him by the Secretary of War. When the St. Albans raiders were discharged from Canadian custody, Dix, in a sweeping order directed his subordinates to pursue future raiders if necessary to effect their capture, across the Canadian boundary.³ Obviously he was unaware that he was violating principles of

1. Montgomery Blair to the Secretary of the Irish National Fair, February 9, 1864, reprinted from 'All The Year Round' in The Fenian Raid on Fort Erie, C. A. Pamphlet No. 2726, 14. Thus far I have been unable to find any file of 'All The Year Round' which I think was a serial. I feel that the utterances of politicians about expansion and possible war with Britain between early 1864 and the election worthy of much more study than I have given them.

2. Official Record, Series I, XLIII, Part II, 557.

3. General Order No. 97, December 14, 1864, Official Record, Series I, XLIII, Part II, 789.

international comity as interpreted by his immediate superiors.¹ Similarly, he seemed to have forgotten for the moment that the President had previously reproved generals for usurping executive functions. Whether or not there was violation of international law and executive usurpation probably would have made little difference if the cohorts of Jacob Thompson had followed the order with an immediate raid and successful retirement to Canada. For, General Butler, who later itched to vindicate his prowess against the British² and who specialized in antagonizing non-combatants, if judged by his record at New Orleans, would probably have crossed the border, preceded by his army to be sure, in 'hot pursuit'.³ Doubtless an armed clash with the Canadians would have followed, for as zealously as the union soldiers waited to chase Confederates back into Canada, the soldiery of the Province stood guard on the frontier to prevent raiding parties from escaping into the States. Scattered bits of evidence, moreover, indicate what might have happened had the forces guarding either side of the boundary come together. One of the marching songs alleged to

1. General Halleck in his manual on international law claimed that a warring nation had no right to violate the territory of a neutral. Dix maintained that the order was justifiable under the so-called right of 'hot pursuit'.

2. Butler to Sumner, June 7, 1869, Sumner Mss, XCIII, 73.

3. I have tried to determine where Butler was stationed at the moment of the crisis. After his army was bottled up in Bermuda Hundred, he was relieved of his command and sent to the northern frontier in early November. I have been able to find no evidence of his removal from this command. Lincoln feared that some subordinate would act rashly, violate the neutrality of Canada, urging the while military necessity. Stanton to Dix, Dec. 15, 1864, Official Record, Series I, XLIII, Part II, 793.

have been popular with Yankee regiments at the time ran:

"Secession first he would put down
Wholly and forever,
And afterward from Britain's crown
He Canada would sever."¹

The members of other regiments were reputed to be "only waiting for the termination of the American Civil War, to 'flesh their bayonets in corpulent Mr. Bull.'"² It seemed as if the possibilities for war with England, to say nothing of conquest, were growing apace.

Congress quickly responded to the drift towards war by showing a willingness to support it. One faction led by Zachariah Chandler, who was later to threaten the conquest of Canada by the veterans of Michigan -- unassisted, ³ desired thoroughly to arm the northern frontier. The Senator had already achieved notoriety as the leader of those who would increase the gigantic military establishment by creating at the slightest provocation new 'blood-letting' machinery.⁴ Now, running true to form, he painted for the benefit of his colleagues to say nothing of his constituents, a vivid picture of the state of apprehension in the border cities. "Thousands of people," he stated, "were kept in arms in Detroit to defend the city from raiders." To

1. Quoted in Keenleyside, Canada and the United States, 139.

2. Quoted from 'All The Year Round' June 4, 1864 in The Fenian Raid at Fort Erie, op. cit., 14. Callahan indicates that this sentiment was prevalent in part of the U. S. forces in the West. One Canadian witness says that this spirit prevailed in army circles as late as April 1866, McKinnon to MacDonald, April 11, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian, II, 383 ff.

3. Chandler's speech of April 14, 1869 was reprinted widely in the press though it was made in an executive session of the Senate.

4. Chandler's career in this particular really began prior to the firing on Fort Sumpter. Chandler to Blair, Dec. 19, 1860 and id. to id., May 9, 1861, Austin Blair Mss.

give the Detroiters the protection they desired, he demanded the enlistment of an army corps expressly to guard the frontier.¹ Lesser men than he, in the lower house of Congress, following his lead, deluged that body with so many bills proposing the erection of a vast naval establishment on the Lakes, that the House created a commission to study the various projects and report upon the most feasible one.² Several of the Representatives from constituencies bordering the Lakes urged the immediate construction of a ship canal around Niagara as a military necessity.³ Mr. Isaac N. Arnold of Illinois pressed the House to appropriate several millions to complete the Illinois-Michigan canal by means of which all the gunboats no longer needed on the Mississippi could be rushed into the Lakes the moment danger threatened from Canada.⁴ Another group, equally as staunch as Chandler and his following in the support of war and conquest, feared only the increase of the executive's power from such a development. With protection against further enhancement of the President's power secured, this faction as its individual members were to show on future occasions, was ready to go to the same limits. Henry

1. Congressional Globe, 38th, 2nd, I, 33. Though the Detroit Free Press denied the truth of this assertion, there is some evidence of a first class nature tending to substantiate it. James Cockburn, Special Canadian Agent, reported: "The state of feeling in Detroit and elsewhere on the American side is such that there would have been retaliation and the two governments would have become involved. Mr. Russell, the U. S. District Attorney was absent in Washington (about this matter) but I had an interview with his assistant ... Mr. Brown, and another gentleman of influence in Detroit, they described the feeling which existed there, when the raid first became known as to have been almost unmanageable." James Cockburn to MacDonald, September 2, 1864, MacDonald Mss., Fenian I, 1 ff.

2. Congressional Globe, 38th, 2nd, II, 1421.

3. Ibid., I, 337.

4. Ibid., 36 & 540.

Winter Davis, now a lameduck from a Maryland constituency, wanted the conduct of foreign affairs and the direction of military policy entrusted solely to Congress.¹ He probably would have become an outstanding leader among the expansionists of the day had it not been for his death early in 1866. His colleague, Johnson in the upper house, when the legality of General Dix's order was questioned, held that it was constitutional.² Senator Sherman, whose brother daily furnished noteworthy examples of the power of generals, found the conduct of General Dix quite in keeping with international practice. To substantiate his position, he read into the record of the discussion long passages from the eminent British authority, Mr. Phillimore, concerning the point.³ That General Halleck, American savant on international procedure, disagreed with the Britisher made little difference, for the Ohio Senator was willing to be guided by John Bull in this much at least. In attempting to discuss international relations, however, the Ohioan was poaching on the preserves which Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, were peculiarly his own. Sidestepping the issues raised as to the President's power and that of a major general, yet unwilling

1. I don't think Davis was at all interested in finding a wise solution for foreign difficulties. He seems rather to have been looking for an issue to embarrass the executive. His attempts to usurp the powers of the President to direct foreign affairs are constant through the 2nd Session of the 38th Congress. That contemporaries felt that Davis was up to mischief is apparent. "Pray put a bridle on the mouth of Winter Davis and other fools, who would get us into a war with England." P. W. Chandler to Sumner, Dec. 29, 1864, Sumner Mss., LXXI, 53 ff.

2. Congressional Globe, 38th, 2nd, I, 57.

3. Ibid., 58 ff.

to divulge his plan for dealing with the English difficulties, Sumner faced the immediate issue. With telling logic he pointed out to his colleagues that they should move cautiously lest they fall into the trap set for them by the Confederates. He insisted that in embroiling the United States and England over Canada "the rebellion would gain that powerful British intervention which would help restore its failing fortunes."¹ The Massachusetts Senator moved hurriedly from the advantage which this appeal gave him and secured, not without opposition, the reference to committees of the measures which had provoked the discussion. Here they were submerged until the crisis had passed which had grown out of the activities of the Confederates, Justice Coursal and General Dix.

Ignoring the fact that the talk of congressmen amounted to little more than fighting rhetoric and threats further to plunder the treasury, the New York World reported in its Washington Special of December 16th "that considerable bitterness exists among the members of Congress with regard to the release of the St. Albans raiders and the tone of feeling is quite up to that of General Dix's order." The Detroit Free Press, whose wholesome attitude towards Canada during the crisis was exceptional amongst the dailies, thought that a conscious effort was being made to 'blow up war with England' over a triviality.² The radical republican press was unanimous in its approval of the step

1. Ibid.

2. The Detroit Free Press, Dec. 21, 1864.

taken by the commander of the troops in the Eastern Military Division. Typical of the comment in these journals was that in the Chicago Tribune. It looked upon the order as a mere "prelude to war with Great Britain."¹ The same editorial illustrates how completely the papers had persuaded themselves of British duplicity, for Medill assured his readers, as had Greeley the day previous, that Great Britain was actually waging war. "She is no longer a neutral, but an active ally of the enemy." However, one cloud of misgiving darkened the otherwise sunny outlook of the radical press. It was feared that the immensely popular order would be revoked by the 'mischievous timidity' of the Secretary of State.

What Mr. Seward who was actually responsible for the foreign policy of the government may have thought of the turn which affairs had taken is cloaked in obscurity. Welles, always quick to record the activities of his pet anathema, feared that his colleague would be afraid to take vigorous action.² His comments in this portion of his ponderous diary indicate that there was no cabinet discussion of the affair. If the President and his Secretary of State exchanged memoranda on the subject, which is not likely, they have not as yet come to light. It might be urged that the Secretary of State was pleased at the direction which events over which he had no control were pushing him. He was still as ardent an expansionist as when throughout April and May, 1861, he had elaborated a grandiose imperialistic scheme for

1. December 16, 1864.

2. Welles, The Diary of, II, 198.

the prevention of internal division.¹ But the wily Seward of 1861 had developed under the stress of the crises of the past three years into a sagacious diplomat. He realized full well the diplomatic advantage which a powerful military establishment gave him; but that he was unwilling to use it save as a threat is well illustrated by his policy in dealing with Napoleon III over Mexico.² Moreover, as will be shown later, he felt the extension of the United States over the whole of North America, by pacific means, to be quite within the realm of possibility. Hence, by direction of the President that portion of General Dix's order authorizing the invasion of neutral territory was promptly revoked.³ At the same time by employing a passport system against the entrance of persons from the adjacent British Provinces, the government showed unmistakably that it would use

1. The scheme was presented to Mr. Lincoln in Seward's 'Thoughts for the Reflection of the President, April 1, 1861.' Nicolay and Hay, who print the reflections in full think that Seward's intentions were serious, Abraham Lincoln, III, 445 ff. The reaction of the British to Seward's plan is told by C. F. Adams. "The impression is general that Mr. Seward is resolved to insult England until she makes a war. He is the bete noir, that frightens them out of all their proprieties. It is of no use to deny it and appeal to fact. They quote what he said to the Duke of Newcastle about insulting England as the only sure passport to popular favor in America, and a part of a speech in which he talked of annexing Canada as an offset to the loss of the slave states. This is the evidence that Mr. Seward is an ogre fully resolved to eat all Englishmen raw. Pitiful as is all this nonsense, it is of no trifling consequence in its political effect. Even our friend Mr. Thurlow Weed with all his sagacity is baffled in every attempt to counteract it. And if war finally happens, it will trace to this source one of its most prominent causes." C. F. Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861, A Cycle of Adams Letters, I, 88.

2. The most recent treatment of the Mexican policy carefully points out how Seward used the military men and their ideas as a threat. Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, VII, 102 ff (Temple, H. W. William H. Seward).

3. Stanton to Dix, Dec. 15, 1864, op. cit.

every pacific means at its disposal to check border depredations.¹ To be sure the politicians who would deal summarily with Great Britain grumbled and the demands of the war-mongering editors for expansion were unmollified; but the grumbling of the former and the agitation of the latter were lost in the excitement attending the capture of Savannah. The Confederacy was truly falling and momentarily all turned to watch.

The British also looked on. Their interest in the spectacle no longer concerned itself with the possible break-up of the United States. Rather they looked to the time when the Union, nominally restored, exultant in the flush of victory, consumed with a desire to avenge the alleged acts of hostility of which the St. Albans raid was the most recent example, might forcibly dispossess them of their colonial prizes. Abundant evidence reveals this deep and abiding apprehension. In September, 1864, the Baring Brothers inquired of their American agent as to whether or not the hostility for England was such as to lead to the conquest of Canada.² Charles Sumner's English correspondents, noble and otherwise, importuned him to prevent war and conquest as an epilogue to the rebellion.³ Many pamphleteers went

1. Executive order of the President, Dec. 17, 1864, Richardson, Messages and Paper, etc., VIII, 3475.

2. S. G. Ward to Mr. Baring (Private), September 5, 1864, Baring Mss. Unfortunately the letter to Ward in which inquiry was made is so faded that it is practically impossible to decipher. However, Ward's reply deals with questions asked so explicitly that Mr. Baring's letter could almost be reconstructed.

3. Duchess of Argyll to Charles Sumner, March 2, 1864, Sumner Mss., CXXXIX, 44; The correspondence of the Duke and Duchess of Argyll with Sumner is published in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Cf. also, Parkes to Sumner, March 12, 1865 CXL, 41; John Bright to Sumner, Jan. 11, 1865, CXXXIX, 7; Duchess of Argyll to Sumner, Feb. 1, 1865, Ibid., 21;

to the heart of the problem. Typical of these was the observation of Alison: "Canada is quite defenseless, and what is more is indefensible. The United States have an enormous army and navy which will soon be idle and in want of employment. They want something to re-unite them, and they imagine a foreign war would have that effect."¹ The 'Thunderer,' Palmerston's organ, was torn between an old and a new love. Intermittently it admonished the Canadians to arm and protect their homes, and then cajoled them to unite and remain pacific as the safest means of propitiating the threatening Yankee.² In the British Parliament early in 1865, when measures looking to the defense of Canada were debated, all of the participants, save John Bright and his followers, expressed the belief that the federal government across the Atlantic would be unable to restrain its militantly minded people from committing acts of aggression should the slightest opportunity arise.³ Even the British Colonial Secretary, after assuring the Governor General of Canada on sundry occasions that the home government entertained no fear of war with the United States, instructed him not to leave Her Majesty's soldiers in Canada in exposed positions where they might be cut off from the strongholds of

Benjamin Moran to Sumner, March 6, 1865, LXXII, 170 (This letter was obviously written by an American in London); Lord Cranworth to Sumner, March 13, 1865, CXXXIX, 88.

1. Alison, A., The Independence of Canada, C. A. Pamphlet No. 2628; Cf. also, The Inter-Colonial Railway etc. No. 2809, 3; Thoughts on Defense, etc., No. 5, 41.

2. The London Times, October 2, 1864, March 8 & 11, 1865.

3. Parliamentary Debates, CLXXVII, 44 ff. These debates were also extensively quoted in the Chicago and New York Tribunes.

Montreal and Quebec by a sudden invasion.¹

In Canada, Archbishop Connolly of Halifax, in close touch at all times with Bishop Hughes of New York, wrote: "Whenever the present difficulties will terminate -- and who can tell the moment -- we will be at the mercy of our neighbors, and victorious or otherwise, they will be eminently a military people, and with all their apparent indifference about annexing this country, and all the friendly feeling that may be talked, they will have the power to strike when they please; and this is precisely the kernel and touchpoint of the whole question. No nation ever had the power of conquest that did not use it or abuse it, at the very first favorable opportunity."² Inspired by the same fear, Thomas D'Arcy McGee, with keen penetration showed that the psychology of the leading men of the United States both in public and private life had been changed by civil conflict from one of peaceful persuasion to that of

1. Cardwell to Monck, July 19, 1864, G-172, 143; Cf. also, Concerning armed vessel under construction at Buffalo, id. to id., June 4, 1864, 5; concerning retaining capitol of Canada at Quebec where it might enjoy protection of fortifications and garrisons, id. to id., June 6, 1864, 21; concerning motion of Mr. Brown of Wisconsin in H. of R. giving notice of termination of the Rush-Bagot Convention, Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, transmitted by Cardwell to Monck, June 20, 1864, G-172, 117 ff; concerning enormous growth of U. S. military establishment, Cardwell to Monck, August 6, 1864, Ibid, 205; concerning the defenses of Canada, id. to id., Jan. 21, 1865, G-173, 69 ff; Carnarvon to Disraeli, Oct. 14, 1866 quoted in Hardyng, Life of Lord Carnarvon, I, 294.

2. Quoted in Watkin, E., Canada and the States, 297 ff.

warlike coercion.¹ Other public men feared as much.² A portion of the Canadian Press, as though its suggestion might be of moment in any decision as to the use of the Yankee hosts once the South was thoroughly subjugated, repeatedly pointed out that the affairs of Mexico demanded attention.³

Lord Palmerston, who did not seem to have been apprehensive of war with the United States at this time, nevertheless inaugurated a program to protect the Empire saved in the days of his youth from Napoleon. In his long career as a British statesman defense through military preparedness was ever his

1. Ibid, 289 ff. Other evidence that the Canadians appreciated this psychological change is to be seen in Parkes to Sumner, Jan. 8, 1865, Sumner Mss, CXXXIX, 3; Joseph Howe to Sir John Rose, March 8, 1865, Howe Mss., IX, 18 ff; id. to Earl of Clarendon, March 20, 1866; ibid., XII, 479 ff; Joseph Howe wrote Lord Stanley that this idea of military prowess as well as the laxity of Britain was ingrained into the minds of the masses in the United States by the reading of Jefferson's Bill of Indictment of 1776. The despatch mentions specifically the psychological change in George Bancroft, Nathaniel P. Banks, Henry Wilson and Charles Sumner, who "are forced to bow to the prevailing sentiment." Howe to Stanley, August 7, 1866, IX, 82 ff. A letter of Joseph Medill illustrates how deeply he was impressed with the growth of military power and its significance, Medill to Sumner, Dec. 2, 1868, Sumner Mss., LXXXVIII, 70.

2. The discussions in the Quebec Conference which worked out the basic plans for the erection of British North America into the Dominion, were closed to the public. Within the past few years notes taken by some of the participants have been coming to light. Some of these indicate that the possibilities of conquest of the Provinces by the United States was discussed. Macdonald, A. A., Notes Taken at the Quebec Conference, October 10 to 27, 1864, C. H. R., I, 46. "I also fear the military element in your future society." Joseph Parkes to Sumner, op. cit.

3. Editorial from Montreal Evening Telegraph reprinted in The Chicago Times, April 8, 1865; Cf. also, Montreal Trade Review, April 7, 1865; reprint from Toronto Leader in the Chicago Tribune, Oct.. 22, 1865; Halifax Citizen, Feb. 8, 1868; "The press of Canada, or at least a portion of it is industrious in showing the United States the advantages from conquering Mexico rather than Canada." The Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1865.

mainstay.¹ During the 'Trent crisis' a large military force had been sent to Canada and left there when the flurry subsided. In 1864 Lt. Col. Jervois was sent to the Provinces to plan a system of fortifications for defense.² The budget proposed just as the American civil war ended carried large sums for the Canadian defenses. Palmerston's underlings in the Colonial Office repeatedly admonished the Governor General to urge preparedness upon the Canadians.³ This Lord Monck did, advising the provincial legislature to match the imperial quotas for defense with liberal colonial appropriations. To give greater effectiveness to the plans for defense as well as to satisfy other colonial and imperial demands, Monck in September, 1864, called the Quebec Conference which worked out the basis for the union of the four provinces immediately adjacent to the Great Republic.⁴ Indubitably these measures would retard conquest once a hostile force invaded British North America. But in

1. Correspondence of Palmerston with Gladstone brings out fully the former's attitude towards military preparedness. Guedella, P., Gladstone and Palmerston. Cf. also "Palmerston is the last of our belligerent race of statesmen." Parkes to Sumner, Oct. 13, 1864, Sumner Mss., CXL, 106.

2. Cardwell to Monck, Feb. 17, 1865, G-173, 161 ff. Jervois, deputy director of fortifications, left England on September 2, 1864. In Canada after a meticulous survey of all contingencies he came to the conclusion that the Province could be defended by fortifying the strategic points of Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto and Fort Erie. Moreover he felt that the Canadian volunteer militia operating in conjunction with Her Majesty's forces in the Canadas and the naval force which could be brought to bear immediately in the St. Lawrence and on Lake Ontario could hold the Yankees in check until the military and naval might of the Empire could be brought into full play.

3. Cardwell to Monck, Jan. 21, 1865, G-173, 69.

4. The confederation movement is comprehensively treated by Trotter, R. G., Canadian Federation. Palmerston's organ stated that union was partially a defense measure, London Times, Oct. 2, 1864.

addition to pressing them with vigor upon the Canadians, Lord Monck attempted to prevent any cause for conquest from materializing by maintaining the same 'benevolent British neutrality' towards the militant North as towards its hated adversaries in the South.

Maintaining neutrality in England three thousand miles from either belligerent was relatively simple as compared with upholding the same policy in Canada set down cheek by jowl with the Yankees whose press with its conquering cry was offending if not terrorizing the Provincials. Hence, Lord Monck was put to it in the fall of 1864 when confederate operations with Canada as a base, were at their height. But the Governor General's policy was equal to the extraordinary occasion. He prohibited and attempted to prevent the sale of any munitions of war to the agents of either of the belligerents.¹ Moreover, he tried to check such sales to private individuals whose characters and purposes were questionable. He let it be known that undesirable aliens who would compromise England's neutrality as well as abuse the right of asylum which they enjoyed in Canada, could be deported according to his instructions.² At the same time the provincial legislature took up the matter of providing an alien deportation statute. He urged the home government to send revenue cutters, as the Rush-Bagot Convention prohibited the use of gunboats, to patrol the upper lakes. In this way he sought to prevent the departure from Canadian ports of armed raiders,

1. Monck to Cardwell, Nov. 25, 1864, G-465, 205.

2. Cardwell to Monck, Jan. 7, 1865, G-173, 11 & 17.

which the Confederates might commission.¹ As notice of any threatened raid came to his attention, he sent special agents to investigate the circumstances with instructions to report them to him for action.² The chances of obtaining information concerning Confederate activities were greatly increased when C. J. Brydges of the Grand Trunk railroad and Thomas Swinyard of the Great Western ordered all station masters to be on the lookout for and report all suspicious characters.³ When Justice Coursal discharged the St. Albans raiders, the Governor General ordered their recommitment.⁴ To prevent further raids from materializing, he "called out for permanent service a large force of the volunteer militia" to patrol the border.⁵ These measures were so effective that nothing more was heard of confederate activities in Canada.

Despite this fact, Congress guided by the retaliatory spirit of a few radical members, attempted to assume direction of the foreign policy. Resolutions approving the abrogation of the Rush-Bagot Convention were adopted.⁶ A bill to terminate reciprocity with Canada, which had suffered defeat the previous spring, was now passed.⁷ The extradition clauses of

1. Monck to Newcastle, March 19, 1863, G - 465, 45.

2. Ibid. Cf. also, James Cockburn to Sir J. A. MacDonald, op. cit.

3. Thomas Swinyard to MacDonald, Dec. 19, 1864, MacDonald Mss., Fenian I, 32 ff.

4. Seward told Burnley that as long as Canada held the St. Albans raiders for a breach of neutrality, the American government would be satisfied, Burnley to Earl Russel, April 7, 1865, G-299, 101 ff.

5. Monck to Burnley, Dec. 20, 1864, G-234, 76 ff.

6. Congressional Globe 38th, 2nd, I, 596 & 688.

7. Ibid, 277.

the Webster-Ashburton agreement were felt to be obsolete. A resolution for their abrogation was introduced in the Senate by Sumner. On February third, members of the House, urging military necessity, forced the passage of a bill for the construction of a ship canal around the falls of Niagara.¹ Congress seemed to be telling the administration that it might deal arbitrarily with the British.

The press, taking its lead from Congress, continued campaigning for the conquest of the British Provinces. As the Civil War ended, the Republican journals were asking: "Whom do we fight next?"² They held to the view that "the decadent systems of Europe, tottering with decrepitude, must fall an easy prey to the spread eagle, and neither haughty oligarchy of Great Britain, the military despotism of France, nor any other of the effete Old World dynasties would be able to resist Manifest Destiny" backed up as it was by "a million of soldiers under able leaders in the field."² Greeley scoffed at the idea that Canada could be defended. The Canadians know, he said, "that their eel-skin of settled country is indefensible against the Half Million of men with which we should promptly invade and suddenly overrun it, in case of hostilities with England."³ Medill boastfully pictured the provincial forces annihilated in one such battle as General Grant fought and the defenses of Toronto

1. Ibid., 537 ff.

2. From a summary article in The Detroit Free Press, May 10, 1865. The editor hoped that the good sense of the country would frown down the incendiary appeals of such journals as the New York Herald and the Tribunes of New York and Chicago.

3. The New York Tribune, June 28, 1865.

outflanked by Sherman.¹

The executive, meantime, busy with plans for reconstruction and the 'closing-up' of the war, paid little heed to the conquering cry of the press and the splenetic mutterings of Congress. As soon as the legislators had gone to their homes, Mr. Seward brushed the congressional action to one side. He promptly withdrew the notice of November 23, 1864 which had advised Her Majesty's government that the United States would no longer adhere to the provisions of the Convention of 1817 limiting naval armaments on the Lakes. Simultaneously in acknowledgment of the vigorous activities of the colonial authorities to check border depredations, he rescinded the passport regulations promulgated on December 17th.² Finally "Mr. Seward expressed the hope" to Her Majesty's government "that what the U. S. Govt. had thus done would be accepted as a substantial proof of the willingness and desire of the Govt. to renew and strengthen its heretofore friendly attitude towards the Province of Canada and all the British Provinces."³ There was no gainsaying that the

1. The Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1865.

2. Executive order, March 8, 1865, Richardson, Messages, VIII, 3483.

3. Earl Russell to Sir Frederick Bruce, April 21, 1865, G-173, 391. Cf. also, "I see that great efforts are made to enforce the so-called Monroe Doctrine in Mexico. I hope the Blairs will not succeed in ousting Mr. Seward and bringing on a conflict with Mexico & France. After a war of that magnitude as you have carried on for four years the country requires peace and rest, quickly to recuperate in all its sections, and to settle the great internal questions, which have sprung up. Mr. Seward as the head of the Department of State is not only in my eyes, but in those of Europe, a guarantee that the controversies growing out of the late war will be settled amicably." R. Schleiden to Sumner, July 25, 1865, Sumner Mss., CXLI, 14 ff.

administration at least wished neither to wage war on Great Britain nor to launch an imperialistic venture.

The knowledge that the United States and Great Britain had arrived at what might be termed a rapprochement should have deterred further agitation for war and the conquest of Canada.¹ But such was not the case. Noisy and thoughtless elements in the body politic daily boasted of the reckoning with Great Britain shortly to come.² Would-be filibusters advertised for recruits to participate in an expedition against Canada.³ The

1. The newspaper editors commented on the changed attitude of the administration after the National Intelligencer had published on March 8th the facts concerning the mutual explanations which had taken place between Great Britain and the U. S.

2. "I returned yesterday from a three weeks sojourn in the cities of New York and Boston and feel more than ever impressed with the absolute necessity of this scheme (probably the confederation scheme) as a measure of defense ... I had no idea of the feeling of hatred and revenge for imaginary wrongs which has taken possession of the American mind amongst the educated and informed until I met them on daily change in those cities and heard them express themselves to each other so freely on these subjects -- they told me plainly that when they had subdued the rebels they would make out an act. against Great Britain for all the depredations committed by the Alabama, Florida and C in C (Confederates in Canada) and if she didn't pay it promptly they would know the reason why, they seem to look upon foreign war as certain ... and feeling their power they are more boastful than ever. We may look about setting our house in order. They are undoubtedly a great people and have great resources if it were not for the wounded and disabled we see around us there is nothing to indicate they are carrying on a great war." James Mathewson to John A. MacDonald, March 11, 1865, MacDonald Mss., General Letters, 1865 - 1866, 62 ff.

3. "I have the honour to report to you that this morning, an Englishman of respectable appearance and evidently truthful, called upon me and informed me that seeing a notice in the 'Brooklyn Eagle,' a third rate newspaper which has a large circulation in Brooklyn, inviting parties to join in an expedition for the annexation of Canada and Mexico, he addressed a note of inquiry to the person whose name appeared at the foot of the advertisement, and received from him a reply, of which, as well as of the note of inquiry I enclose copies for your information." The first enclosure reads: "The writer would be glad to learn what is con-

Fenians, a semi-military organization interested in righting the political wrongs of Ireland, were reputed to have a hundred thousand volunteers ready and eager to march upon the citadel of Quebec at a moment's notice.¹ Prominent Republicans, such as Secretary Stanton and Charles Sumner, toyed with the idea of conquest.² But with Congress adjourned and no means therefore available for pushing the Secretary of State into activity which he opposed, the play of Stanton came to naught.³ Their powerful

templated in the matter referred to by advertisement in the 'Brooklyn Eagle' of this date and subscribed George W. Gibbons. Any communications for the writer may be addressed X. Z. Box 75, Brooklyn Post Office." The reply: "Your note of the 8th instant received and in answer would say that it is my intention of raising at least three thousand men out of this country to cooperate with a larger body either to invade Mexico or British America. If we can gain the consent of the President of the United States to this enterprise we will do so. If not we will go anyhow." E. M. Archibald, Consul General At New York To Sir Frederick Bruce, May 13, 1865, G 174, 12 ff. Cf. also, concerning a filibustering expedition to leave Cape Vincent for Kingston, Seward to Burnley, Feb. 8, 1865, G 235, 83 ff.

1. Callahan, op. cit., Cf. also, The Chicago Tribune, Jan. 26, 1865.

2. "Stanton says that it is evident that we must take possession of Canada." Sumner to Lieber, March 29, 1865, Sumner Mss., Letters and Papers to Correspondents. It is quite evident from the accounts in the newspapers that Stanton wished to use the alleged participation of Thompson and Clay in the plot for the Assassination of Lincoln as further evidence of the duplicity of the Canadian government and as an excuse for invading the British Provinces. Detroit Free Press, April 29, 1865.

3. If Welles is correct Stanton and Sumner were working hand in glove as early as April 16th. What they might have done concerning foreign policy is of course conjectural, but the hatred which each later displayed for Johnson because neither one could direct the President's reconstruction policy might have been loosed on Seward, for neither Stanton nor Sumner ever approved of the conduct of foreign affairs. Welles, Diary, II, 290 ff.

allies Greeley and Medill as well as Bennett, spasmodically recommended war with Britain. The latter two always carefully pointed out that a humbling of John Bull meant vast additions to the public domain. A flock of satellite organs followed their lead. Other papers less powerful, sensed danger.¹ 'Why,' they asked, 'go to war to realize 'Manifest Destiny' when by waiting but a few years, economic necessity caused by Britain's new imperial policy would make the whole unbounded continent ours.' As 1865 wore on, the idea of forcing Canadian annexation through economic pressure gained greater currency. The nation dismantled its war machinery and the possibilities of realizing 'Manifest Destiny' at the point of the bayonet went into eclipse.

1. Notable among these was the Boston Daily Advertiser and the Detroit Free Press. The editors urged their readers to avoid being swept into war by hasty and ill-considered motives. Advertiser, March 13, 1865; Free Press, May 10, 1865.

Chapter II

RECIPROCITY REPEAL AND CANADIAN ANNEXATION.

Long before it became apparent to the war-mongers that the government of the United States would not assume the leadership in the conquest of British North America, certain economic forces were operating to effect the annexation of this rich prize. The first of these gained political importance with the advent of a determined fight to repeal the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. The treaty which was 'put across' by Secretary of State Marcy, Lord Elgin and senators with peculiar and diverse interests to serve¹ brought mutual benefits and a few disadvantages to the peoples of the northern tier of states and the adjacent British Provinces. Every student of the operation of this treaty agrees as to these benefits. Many contemporaries saw them.² But from the start,

1. The study of Messrs. Allin and Jones, Annexation, Preferential Trade and Reciprocity, is the most comprehensive discussion of the inception of reciprocity between the United States and British North America in 1854. The authors point out that the southern senators who wished to prevent any possible annexation of potential free-soil territory, combined with senators from the West who desired the free navigation of the well canalized St. Lawrence system and New England senators who were interested in greater privileges in British waters for their constituents, to secure ratification of the convention. Tansill's, Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 traces carefully the work of Secretary of State Marcy and Lord Elgin.

2. Two of the three agents, Derby of Mass. and Taylor of Minn., employed by the U. S. to study the operation of the treaty, considered it advantageous and recommended only minor modifications. Israel D. Hatch of Buffalo saw only the disadvantages accruing to the commercial interests along the Erie Canal. The reports of these men were issued as House Documents. It is doubtful whether or not they received either wide circulation or very close study. David A. Wells, who studied reciprocity incidental to tax revision, also favored a continuation of the treaty with certain modifications due to changed economic circumstances of the contracting parties.

certain commercial men of influence, mine operators in the Maryland and Jersey fields, lumbering interests of Maine and Michigan and newly rising industrialists, looked with disfavor upon the treaty. The commercial men of New York were particularly disgruntled because they had to meet the competition of the St. Lawrence all-water route in carrying food-stuffs and other commodities supplied by the West to a world market. This was particularly true of the Erie Canal interests. The miners found that Pictou coal quickly drove them from the New England market. Lumbermen soon learned that Canadian competition kept prices at a low level and thoughtless industrialists felt that the Canadian tariff on American manufactured products stifled the expansion of their industries. Consequently with the increasing political importance of these economic groups incidental to the Civil War, efforts were begun to repeal the Elgin-Marcy Convention, as the treaty is sometimes designated.

The southern members had scarcely shaken the dust of Washington from their feet, when a resolution was pushed through the Senate taking the Canadians to task for violating the spirit of the Reciprocity Treaty.¹ Congress accused the Canadian

1. Though the press commented on the adoption of this resolution in early March, 1861, a careful search of the Congressional Globe fails to reveal any record of it. It may be that the resolution was presented in the executive sessions of either March 8th or 12th or omitted due to the excitement attending consideration of 'the state of the Union.' It has occurred to me that the charge of the Canadians that Mr. Seward was behind the move may be well founded for Seward was certainly seeking to involve the U. S. in complications with foreign powers so that domestic difficulties might be avoided. However, I have seen no specific evidence which tends to bear out this supposition.

government of imposing "heavy duties on many articles which the United States had to sell, while nearly all Canadian exports were admitted free of duty; and, further, the accusation was made that Canadian legislation had imposed 'discriminating tolls and duties in favor of an isolating and exclusive policy' against American merchants and forwarders, 'meant and intended to destroy the natural effect of the treaty and contrary to its spirit.'"¹ As might have been expected, the New York delegation in Congress was pushing this move to nullify or repeal the Reciprocity Treaty. The Montreal Gazette, commenting on the passage of the resolution, pointed out that Mr. Seward and particular New York State interests were the moving forces in the attempt to change the policy of the United States. Further the paper observed: "After such a tariff (the Morrill) as that just passed by the Congress of the United States, it is not often one meets anything so refreshingly cool as this Senate resolution about the 'spirit' of the Reciprocity Treaty."² The Canadians had no immediate cause for alarm. New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey, where protection held sway, wished repeal; but New England which enjoyed a considerable trade with the Maritime Provinces³ and appreciated the extensive privileges

1. Macdonald, H., Canadian Public Opinion on the American Civil War, 194.

2. The Montreal Gazette, March 13, 1861.

3. Keenleyside states that there was considerable interchange of commodities all along the frontier. Keenleyside, Canada and the United States, 298. The observation of A. A. Macdonald, at the Quebec Conference that "a very small portion of our imports come from Canada while a very considerable portion come from the United States. Our people have no facilities for trade with Canada, they had to go to the United States. It took a month for a reply to be received to a letter addressed to Canada and the postage was double what it was between Canada and

accorded her fishermen in British American waters, firmly supported the agreement. The West, where protection was taking hold only slowly and where ready communication with the world which consumed its commodities was vital, would not ally itself with the Middle States. Hence, though at intervals during the next Congress (37th) the Middle States moved either for modification or repeal of the agreement, they made little headway, for they lacked a motive sufficiently strong to bring the other two sections into line. Besides, neither the United States nor Great Britain could terminate the treaty by formal notice until the agreement had been in operation for ten years.¹

With the members of the House facing their constituents at the polls in the autumn of 1864, there was during the spring in Washington a great scrambling for political capital with which to capture votes. It was, therefore, natural for members serving powerful interests once more to attack the Reciprocity Treaty. Throughout the whole of the protracted debate on the resolutions calling for either abrogation or modification, those who favored the treaty consistently demanded that it be judged on facts pertinent thereto. The opposition members realizing

Britain," illustrates how completely dependent upon the states the maritimers were. Macdonald, A. A., Notes taken at the Quebec Conference held October 10 to 27, 1864, C. H. R., I, 29.

1. Article V of the treaty provides in part: "The treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the date at which it may come into operation, and further until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same." Malloy, *Treaties, etc.*, I, 672.

that the facts incontrovertibly furthered the maintenance of the treaty, ignored them. They built their case on a shoddy chauvinism. Mr. Pike of Maine recapitulated in great detail the acts of hostility visited upon the United States by Great Britain and concluded by insisting that just retaliation demanded the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty. Mr. Arnold of Illinois who ably defended the West's need for communication was told in substance that it was unpatriotic for grain-growers to send their commodities overseas through the canals and in the bottoms of a power whose negligence had permitted the escape of the 'Pirate Alabama' and driven in this covert way American commerce carriers from the ocean. The opposition, likewise, paid its respects to the rebels, as Kelly of Pennsylvania read into the record a statement purported to have come from Toombs a few years before, that the treaty was pushed through by the southerners to prevent annexation sentiment from growing in Canada. Lesser men than Kelly immediately reasoned that abrogation of the treaty meant the annexation of the Provinces and shortly the 'changes were rung' on 'Manifest Destiny' with a vengeance. Despite the use of invective animus for Britain and questionable patriotic appeals, the saner members of Congress refused to be pushed into final action. Hence, the resolution calling upon the executive to give formal notice of the termination of the treaty was postponed by a meager majority of five for consideration at another session.¹

1. The voting as well as the discussion cut through party and sectional alignments. Members representing the Champlain and

If the nation heeded the record congressmen were writing, there is little evidence extant to indicate its reaction to the threatened repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty. The dailies, busy with prognostications as to the approaching spring and summer military operations, were silent. A cursory survey of the campaign speeches of the autumn shows that the record written in the spring was ignored. But, while the question was under discussion Canadians followed it attentively. Lord Monck, the governor general, wrote: "I have reason to believe that the Government of the United States though friendly to the maintenance of the Treaty will not be able to defeat in the Legislature the motion calling upon the President to give the year's notice for its abrogation -- But even were this otherwise I should be of opinion that the condition of Canadian trade -- so far as it is affected by this Treaty would be most unsatisfactory after the lapse of the ten years from the time of its original promulgation unless some new arrangement is made for its continuance during a further fixed period."¹ C. J. Brydges, managing director of the Grand Trunk railroad and also agent of the Hudson Bay Company, whose interest in the continuance of reciprocity was more immediate than that of Lord Monck, penetratingly observed

far up-state districts of New York favored the maintenance of the treaty; while members representing canal interests were opposed. Representative Pike of Maine with lumber interests to serve and closely associated with men operating large cod-fishing fleets was opposed; while some of his colleagues representing in-shore mackerel and herring fishermen ardently supported the treaty. The debates are scattered through the Congressional Globe, 38th, 1st. The principal speeches are between 2364 - 2371; 2452 - 2483 & 2502 - 2509.

1. Monck to the Duke of Newcastle, March 15, 1864, G-465, 42.

to an American correspondent: "The effect, I think, of the discussion which is taking place in Congress, will be contrary in Canada to what is anticipated by those who are anxious for the disruption of the Treaty. It would seem to be an idea, that the course intended to be pursued of giving notice of the ending of the Treaty would of necessity drive Canada into the Consideration of the question of becoming annexed to the United States. I believe that that question is farther off than ever it was, and less likely to be taken into account than at any period hitherto in the history of this Province. The effect I believe -- on the country -- will be a feeling that the counsels of the United States are being guided more by passion than by reason, and to make it therefore a necessity for Canada to take the necessary steps for placing herself throughout the year in a position of entire independence, as regards communication through the United States."¹ The Canadians were learning the temper of the United States.

Soon these colonials were to learn the importance of ready communication through the States. But, on the other hand, citizens of the northern tier of American states particularly those in the Old Northwest were also soon to be instructed concerning the necessities of easy access through Canada. When four days after Justice Coursal released the St. Albans raiders, Mr. Seward instituted vigorous passport regulations governing egress from Canada and the other British Provinces, the shippers of the East

¹ I. C. J. Brydges to J. W. Taylor, February 22, 1864, Taylor Mss.

and West as well as the Canadians abruptly experienced the disruption of the free and untrammelled intercourse which had prevailed for a decade.¹ Shortly, to add to the vexation of the shippers, the Treasury Department ordered the strictest enforcement of the Smuggling Act. This meant that every cargo entering the United States from the British colonies had either to be fully unloaded at the point of entry for inspection by the customs officials or inspected during the original loading by a consul of the United States who sealed the cargo carrier and certified as to its contents.² The press of Detroit and Chicago fulminated at length concerning the stupidity of the regulations. Within a week the Free Press of the former city demanded, in a stinging editorial, that the congressmen from Michigan insist upon the immediate cancellation of the order because it unnecessarily restricted trade.³ Chandler and his colleagues it may be noted in passing, ignored the demand and spurned with unconcealed contempt petitions and memorials showered upon them by the Detroit Board of Trade and other commercial organizations.⁴ Chandler's time to face his constituents was yet four years distant. Unable to get action, Detroiters further speculated that the passport system "must be designed, from the injury it is calcu-

1. One aspect of Seward's intentions has been previously treated. See Chapter I, 21 following.

2. The Smuggling Act became law June 27, 1864.

3. The Detroit Free Press, Dec. 23, 1864.

4. There is an abundance of evidence in the Detroit dailies of the period to show that many petitions were sent to Chandler and others in Congress, but there is not a shred of evidence in the Congressional Globe of the presentation of any of these petitions though Chandler was always careful to present petitions calling for additional armed forces to guard the frontier.

lated to inflict on the Canadian railroads, to affect the policy of that government and that of Great Britain towards ours. If such be its object it is an act in the nature of a reprisal -- retaliation -- and as such an act it is one of the steps, irritating and calculated to add to the ill-blood already existing, and provoking others of a like nature in return, and, in the end, resulting in war."¹ The railroads of Canada truly suffered.

Thomas Swinyard, manager of the Great Western, estimated that the Grand Trunk and his road were losing at least eighty thousand dollars a month.² Duncan Stewart one of the largest shippers of Detroit pointed out that thirty to forty thousand tons of freight a week were being dammed up, creating an intolerable congestion³ But the importunings of boards of trade, influential citizens, the press and prominent Canadians availed naught. The American Secretary of State remained adamant, hinting darkly that reasons of state⁴ which could not for the present be divulged, dictated

1. The Detroit Free Press, Jan. 10, 1865.

2. Swinyard to MacDonald, Dec. 21, 1864, Macdonald Mss., Fenian I, 39.

3. Stewart was so incensed that he published two long open letters concerning the injustice done the West. The first of these appeared in the Detroit Free Press, March 22, 1865.

4. It might be argued that the 'reasons of state' consisted of Mr. Seward's desire to use the passport system and the rigid enforcement of the Smuggling Act to bring pressure to bear on Her Majesty's government to permit the appointment of additional consuls at strategic points in Canada. Seward was attempting to secure permission to appoint eighteen additional consuls in the British Provinces at this time. As consistently as he applied to the Foreign Office, he received refusals. A large part of the congestion of freight and the losses sustained by the Grand Trunk and Great Western were caused by an inadequate consular service and misunderstanding of the meticulous regulations. However, I believe that Mr. Seward wanted the new consuls in Canada to further annexation schemes and the British, apprehending this, prevented their appointment. At some future date I intend to

his action. Seward, as it will appear later, was burning with annexation fever.

The Executive Department of the federal government had moved swiftly, and substantially ended reciprocity by carefully considered regulatory measures. The excitement which prompted this action also influenced Congress to reconsider the pending joint-resolution calling upon the President to serve notice on Her Majesty's government that the Reciprocity Treaty would terminate one year hence. The very day that the news of Justice Coursal's release of the St. Albans raiders reached Washington, the joint-resolution concerning the Marcy-Elgin Convention was introduced into the Senate along with sundry bills designed to set the defenses of the northern frontier in order. A wrangle ensued as to which committee, Finance, Commerce or Foreign Affairs should take the matter in charge. To end the squabble, it was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of which Charles Sumner, Senator from Massachusetts, was chairman.¹ On December 21st Sumner reported the resolution in an amended form out of committee.² Though he explained the reason

search fully the various reports sent to the State Department by consuls in the British Provinces at this period. Cf. also The Detroit Free Press, January 5, 1865.

1. The disagreement grew out of the fact that Sumner wanted to take the matter in hand; while Sherman felt that his committee should have it and Chandler since the treaty was commercial in nature held that consideration of the resolution rightly belonged to his committee. Congressional Globe, 38th, 2nd, I, 34 ff.

2. The committee thought the original resolution too vicious and subject to misinterpretation abroad. It reads: "Whereas under the treaty made by the United States with Great Britain, proclamation of which was made by the President of the United States on the 11th of September, 1854, for purpose of extending reciprocal trade between the British North American

for the amended form, he held it unnecessary to set forth the reasons which had led the Committee unanimously to recommend adoption, because he felt that the Senate was of one mind in its desire to abrogate the treaty. Sumner's reckonings were inaccurate. Hale of New Hampshire objected to hasty action guided, as he averred, by passion. After a minor tilt with the Massachusetts senator who had tried to silence his New Hampshire colleague by ridiculing that member's plea for time so that the senators might study the workings of the treaty, Hale secured postponement of consideration until after the Christmas recess.¹

Senators could have employed the interval given them by the postponement to study reciprocity. Obviously from the record written on January 11 and 12, 1865, they did not do so, for the remarks made disclose that many of the participants in the debate did not understand the workings of the Reciprocity Treaty and would have been put to it to define the general term 'reciprocity'.²

colonies and the United States, nearly all the articles which Canada has to sell are admitted into the United States free of duty, while heavy duties are now imposed upon many of those articles which the people of the United States have to sell, with the intention of excluding them from the Canadian market; and whereas the President of the United States in the first session of the Thirty-Sixth Congress, caused to be submitted to the House of Representatives an official report setting forth the inequality and injustice existing in our present intercourse with Canada, subversive of the true intent of the treaty, owing to the subsequent legislation of Canada;" The substitute omitted this preamble and read simply: "And whereas further, it is no longer for the interests of the United States to continue the same in force." Ibid, 96.

1. Sumner tried to shut off discussion by talking a lot of nonsense about the sacred usages of the Senate. Ibid, 95, ff.

2. During the discussion several of the senators deplored the fact that the Canadians did not buy lumber and other such products of which they had an abundance from producers in the States. Consumers south of the frontier purchased large quantities of these from the Canadians. The case was similar with cod--Nova Scotians did not buy cod from New Englanders; but sent quantities

Mr. Hale bore the brunt of the defense argument. He showed with unequivocal logic that the treaty had benefited each section of the United States -- West, Northeast and Middle -- bolstered his argument with statistics which were irrefutable,¹ and concluded by telling his colleagues that they were being pushed into a regrettable step in a spirit of retaliation. Senators Sumner, Sherman and Collamer answered him. The first named opened with a deliberate dodge by attempting to show that reciprocity was only 'so-called.' Then, stating only half-truths, he proved to his own satisfaction at least, that the Canadians had all of the advantage while the States suffered. Shortly he gloated to his friend Francis Lieber: "In terminating the Reciprocity Treaty, you will observe that we have a full year in which to negotiate a substitute. You will see at once that it was essential to the success of any new negotiation that we should be released from the old treaty. We are now 'master of the situation.'"² The Ohio Senator grumbled because none of the commodities imported from the British Provinces could be taxed -- as thought there

of them into the American market. Ridiculous as it may seem, the profound conclusion drawn was that there was no reciprocity despite the fact that other commodities, such as pork, beef and manufactured stuffs of all sorts were sent into the Provinces. Congressional Globe, 38th, 2nd, I, 229.

1. The data were furnished by the Secretary of Treasury to the House on Feb. 21, 1864, Ibid, 204. Later Mr. Howe quoted the statistics furnished by the provincial government. These tallied save in a few instances with those of the American Secretary of Treasury. Ibid, 212. The opposition, faced with facts which could not be gainsaid assumed a Disraelian attitude toward them -- 'There are lies, damned lies and statistics.'

2. January 20, 1865, Sumner Mss., Letters and Papers to Correspondents.

were not already sufficient objects upon which revenue could be raised. Collamer insisted that the treaty interfered with the prerogative of the House in raising revenue.¹ He concluded this phase of his argument by asserting that such a treaty should never have been negotiated and further that the honest industry of the North would not have been hampered with this one save for the connivance of the rebellious southerners. Herewith Collamer loosed the bogey of 'Manifest Destiny' once more. Senators with even a little imagination could vision the French-Canadian and American frontiersman bowing to one flag, throbbing to one national anthem, while Great Britain wept over the loss of her North American possessions. It was pleasant to contemplate the expansion which would follow close on the heels of the repeal of reciprocity. Two decades previous the Vermonter's enticing argument would have cinched the case. But now a new generation of politicians must have their say. Zackariah Chandler, Solomen Foot of Vermont, N. A. Farwell of Maine and others, protectionists and monopolists all, demanded abrogation so that American industry might be given the protective wall it needed. At the last moment, Sumner's brother-Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Wilson, Ramsey of Minnesota whose constituents unreservedly favored the treaty, and Hale of New Hampshire, joined forces to

1. That the Vermont Senator, who was probably more interested in getting a duty placed on cut-stone than in any thing else, did not realize what radicals of the caliber of Henry Winter Davis would make of this statement as they attacked the prerogatives of the President and Senate is apparent. Other senators took alarm and Howe of Wisconsin made the Vermonter 'back water' until the whole elaborate argument he had constructed as to the unconstitutionality of the treaty was cut to pieces. Congressional Globe, op. cit., 209.

secure an amendment ordering the executive to appoint a commission to negotiate a new treaty. Their attempt was futile -- as was also Ramsey's move to postpone action, for over the Virginia hills some perceived the southern senators who might prevent repeal returning to the fold.¹ The vote was taken -- thirty-three to eight for abrogation. Congress had unmistakably shown its feeling.

The American Secretary of State approved the action of Congress and set about embracing the opportunities for expansion which the new situation offered. At once he instructed the American Minister in London to serve notice on Her Majesty's government that 'it was no longer for the interests of the United States' to adhere to the provisions of the Reciprocity Treaty. Before the notice could legally be given on March 17, 1865,² Seward, to superficial appearances, seemed to have changed his mind, for on March 9th, he advised Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Washington that he had instructed Mr. Adams to withdraw the notice, previously given, of the desire of the United States to terminate the Rush-Bagot Convention.³ In the same

1. Inferentially it can be shown that the approaching collapse of the rebellion influenced immediate action. There are scattered references throughout the discussion to the approach of peace and to the advantages the southern 'free-traders' would derive from a continuance of the treaty.

2. According to Article V of the treaty, it could not be terminated by either of the contracting parties by formal notice until one full year after the notice had been given. Furthermore the notice could not be given until the treaty had been in operation for ten years. The treaty actually became operative March 17, 1855.

3. Congress had authorized the serving of this notice after the notice had actually been given. If Mr. Seward could ignore the joint-resolution of Congress which instructed the executive to give notice of the termination of the convention, why could he

interview, he told Mr. Burnley that because mutual explanations had taken place, the orders establishing the passport system would be rescinded. Almost simultaneously he brought pressure to bear on his colleague, McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, to modify the rigidity with which the provisions of the Smuggling Act were being enforced.¹ Further Mr. Seward told Burnley that the United States would be "perfectly willing as the season advanced to enter into negotiations for a remodelling of the Reciprocity Treaty on terms which might prove, he hoped, advantageous and beneficial to both parties."²

Either Mr. Seward was playing the role of the 'proverbial diplomat' or he was unaware that the policy which he had inaugurated in December was forcing certain Canadians to contemplate annexation to the United States and certain Americans to hope for expansion. The evidence direct and indirect, which can be brought to bear to determine Seward's real attitude tends to indicate that he was playing the diplomat, and entertained no

not have done the same with regard to the Reciprocity Treaty? The resolution authorizing service of notice in the case of each of these treaties does not contain the clause, 'if not incompatible with the public interest.' Hence, Seward had no loop-hole through which to crawl. Perhaps certain of his enemies might have censored him and even instituted impeachment proceedings against him had he failed to serve notice to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty as instructed. Why these same enemies did not attack him for withdrawing the notice to terminate the Rush-Bagot Convention remains a puzzle, particularly when one notes that an abortive effort was made to impeach one of Seward's appointees, Charles Francis Adams for malfeasance in office.

1. C. J. Brydges early questioned the rigidity with which petty officials enforced this act. Working through the Governor General of Canada and Her Majesty's Minister in Washington, who brought pressure to bear on Seward, who in turn pressed McCulloch, Brydges secured modification in the enforcement of the regulations. The whole of the correspondence concerning this incident is to be found in the Canadian Archives in folios G-235 & 236.

2. Burnley to Earl Russell, March 9, 1865, G-173, 310.

serious intention of reopening the question of reciprocity. Already the American newspapers from Chicago to New York were making much of the expansion northward which would shortly follow the abrogation of reciprocity.¹ Palmerston's organ, The London Times, as has been previously pointed out, seemed to be playing into the hands of the 'Little Englanders' by stating periodically that the North American colonies were not worth defending from their aggressive neighbor to the south. John Bright and his followers were painting for their hearers glowing pictures of the blessings which would flow out of the absorption of the North American provinces by the American union.² Prominent Canadian politicians, in and out of power, were threatening to make an issue of annexation.³ It was being openly talked in the streets

1. Despite the fact that Medill believed that the West derived enormous advantages from the Reciprocity Treaty, when repeal of the treaty to further annexation was mooted, he espoused that cause with avidity. His first leading editorial on the subject appeared in the Chicago Tribune on Dec. 21, 1864. Greeley, always an arch-protectionist, put his Tribune behind reciprocity repeal the moment it was talked. When annexation was thrown into the discussion as one of the motives for abrogating the treaty, Greeley also espoused annexation. His first lead editorial appeared Dec. 15, 1864. A number of lesser papers which were nothing more than shadows of the two Tribunes also espoused abrogation and annexation.

2. The particular speech of John Bright made in Parliament in February, 1865 was quoted in most of the leading American dailies.

3. Amongst these were Messrs. Holton, Dorian, Isaac Buchanan, and John Young, all of whom had held high office but were for the moment out of power. Buchanan was in continuous communication with James W. Taylor in the U. S. The others, in so far as I have been able to determine, had no connections with American expansionists. A. T. Galt, Minister of Finance, was suspected of toying with the annexation idea. I do not believe that these men with the possible exception of Buchanan were entertaining serious thoughts of annexation. They were using it as a tool to prevent large expenditures of colonial funds for defense and to further their own 'peculiar' interests.

of Montreal.¹ If John F. Potter, consul-general of the United States, stationed at Montreal, did not report these facts to his government, his activity at the Detroit Commercial Convention four months later, is absurd. Too, according to James Gordon Bennett, Robert J. Walker, arch-expansionist of the forties, packed off to Montreal in the middle of March to further annexation.² Seward may have been behind Walker's move; but whether he was or not, he certainly must have known of it and he surely must have realized that he could use the forces which were furthering a policy of expansion such as he had time and again unreservedly approved.³ When efforts were made to negotiate a

1. "The advocates of the 'Manifest Destiny' policy in Montreal are very confident of the ultimate triumph of their annexation principles they talk it openly and boldly in our streets. With therefore these enemies in our midst I will say to you in confidence we are not satisfied to leave our interests in the hands of Mr. Galt or have him represent us in these negotiations. I but express the feelings and views of the truly British amongst us when I say that we believe he sympathizes fully with the opinions of Holton Young & Company on this question. You see therefore the motive that induces us to urge you to throw yourself into the breach, and save British interests in this Country for all time." Mathewson to MacDonald, March 22, 1865, MacDonald Mss., General, 1865 & 1866, 90 ff.

2. Bennett claimed that though the ostensible reason that Walker went to Montreal was to further peace negotiations with the rebels -- C. C. Clay and Jacob Thompson -- his real reason was to further annexation. Walker promptly denied both charges claiming that he went on private business. Some genius probably may determine the line of distinction between Walker's private and public business. The British charge d' affaires in Washington felt that the facts in the case were sufficiently important to warrant advising his government of them. Burnley to Russell, March 27, 1865, G-173, 373 ff.

3. It is inconceivable to me that Walker, who was an administration man, could move about without Mr. Seward's knowledge. I think that Walker may have been a special agent of the State Department at the time. If he were not and he had learned anything which would have furthered annexation while he was in Montreal (it should be noted in passing that he was there at the very time that Mathewson a thoroughly trustworthy witness reported annexation sentiment rampant) he would have reported it to

new reciprocity treaty, Seward, though receiving the Canadian commissioners cordially, was, behind the scenes, opposed to any new arrangement.¹

Not all of the interests in the United States would benefit from the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty unless, of course, annexation of the Provinces should speedily follow. This was particularly true of the commercial interests. Consequently when Seward had substantially set at naught the existing arrangements and Congress was pushing through measures calculated to end free exchange of goods once and for all, those interests, which believed that annexation might even follow a continuance of reciprocity, commenced a concerted drive in its behalf. A prominent trader of New York, S. Dewitt Bloodgood, importuned Sumner: "In the report of the proceedings of the last meeting of the Board of Trade of Montreal, it was there admitted that reciprocity was more to them than confederation. In fact our hostile commercial attitude is now the principal argument with the friends of that project. If we wish to have Canada drop into the Union of its own accord ... all we have to

Seward. At some future time I hope to search the various series of correspondence in the State Department particularly the letters and reports from consuls in the Provinces, reports of special agents and the miscellaneous letters. They should reveal a good deal.

1. "I did not forward to you a statement of the propositions made to me by Mr. Galt with reference to a renewal of the Treaty, as I agreed to, because after seeing you I had an interview with Mr. Seward, who spoke so strongly in opposition to the reopening of negotiations, that it discouraged me from saying anything further on the subject." Wells to Sumner, undated, Sumner Mss., LXXVI, 31. From the internal evidence in this letter it is reasonably certain that it was written between January 1st and 18th, 1866.

do is to trade with them on the fairest & most liberal principles"¹
That the New York trader was not merely stating a supposition when
he observed in the same communication that "all the Boards of
Trade have declared the value of our present commercial relations
with the British Provinces" is easily demonstrated with impeccable
evidence. Sumner when reporting the resolution from the Committee
on Foreign Affairs requesting the Senate to terminate the Reciprocity
Treaty asked that the committee be relieved from further consideration
"of a memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of St. Paul, Minnesota,
remonstrating against any action at the present session of Congress
terminating the Reciprocity treaty, and also sundry petitions from
Connecticut, from Wisconsin, from the Chamber of Commerce of Milwaukee,
and sundry other papers on the same subject."² If Sumner had been dependent
upon the support of the Boston Board of Trade for continuance in office,
he might have taken alarm at the report it sent to Congress early in 1865.
After setting forth with elaborate detail all the facts it could gather
concerning the operation of the Reciprocity Treaty, the Board concluded:
"We are amazed at the efforts to abrogate the 'Reciprocity Treaty'
of June 5, 1854, without an overture for negotiation."³ The New York
Chamber of Commerce came to the same con-

1. February 14, 1865, Sumner Mss., LXXII, 108.

2. The Congressional Globe, 38th, 2nd, 1, 71. I have checked as many of these petitions and memorials as I can find. All of them save those from Philadelphia and one or two minor Vermont towns asked continuance of the treaty.

3. Report of a Special Committee of the Boston Board of Trade concerning the Reciprocity Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, of June 5, 1854. Submitted and Adopted, Jan. 2, 1865, C. A. Pamphlet No. 2632, 23.

clusion. It prepared a most elaborate survey of the situation. Among the findings of the committee who made the study, was the important fact that almost every board of trade and chamber of commerce wished the Reciprocity Treaty not only continued but broadened. It also discovered that the only opinion favoring abrogation sprang from the political maneuverings of demagogues. It asked Congress after the resolution for repeal had been adopted, to continue the treaty;¹ but Congress remained intransigent.

Of all the American cities which would suffer immediately by the abrogation of the treaty, Detroit was foremost. During the ten years that relatively unrestricted trade with the British Provinces in North America had existed, the Michigan city had enjoyed an ever expanding commerce with the colonials. The Detroiters' efforts to prevent the repeal of the treaty were more insistent than those of the other cities, for when efforts failed to stay the hand of Congress, Detroit continued the fight. Early in the year invitations were issued to the boards of trade and chambers of commerce of the principal American cities and those of the British Provinces to attend a commercial convention to be held in the city of Detroit in July for the express purpose of considering the continuance of reciprocity. Preparatory to the assembling of this convention, the aid of the Detroit Free Press, the only daily in the city not controlled by Chandler, was enlisted. Shortly, there appeared in its columns leading articles

1. Senator Hale asked Congress to wait until the Chamber of Commerce of New York had sent in its findings. He had been previously advised that the study of the whole problem was being carried forward by that body. Congress ignored Hale's reasonable request for delay.

tracing in detail the history of the Reciprocity Treaty, statements showing the advantages various portions of the United States had derived from its operation, open letters from prominent merchants predicting disastrous results which would flow from political tampering with trade which was firmly established and analyses of the natural resources of the British Provinces which were benefiting American consumers and manufacturers alike.¹ Detroit had started a counter-blast of propaganda, but to little avail for the items appearing in her dailies circulated only locally. Furthermore, the appeals of the Detroiters were based on economic factors and showed something of a grasp of international relations not easily comprehended, while the arguments advanced by more powerful dailies were political, retaliatory and narrowly provincial.

A careful study of the two principal journals -- East and West -- interested in Canadian annexation, tends to indicate that as the campaign of the Detroit Free Press was swinging into its full stride, the respective editors took alarm.² From the middle of June until the Detroit Commercial Convention actually assembled in mid-July, they loosed a barrage of editorial comments and feature articles opposing further extension of trade privileges to the colonials of the hated John Bull. Each of these papers, moreover, employed competent feature writers to extol the benefits (principally annexation of the Provinces and punishment of

1. The Detroit Free Press Jan. 23, March 22, 18, 24, 16, June 1 and 17, 1865.

2. Only a few references to the repeal of reciprocity per se (and these are of a minor character) appear in either the Chicago or New York Tribune between Jan. 15 and June 15, 1865.

Great Britain for sympathizing with the rebels in the late war), which would follow the interruption of trade. The relations between the feature writers, George Sheppard and James W. Taylor, of these two papers, is interesting. That they were acquainted is beyond question.¹ The evidence in their articles shows that they either frequently exchanged ideas or borrowed from one another with little restriction.² Simultaneously, with the appearance of their articles, Greeley and Medill commented editorially on the wisest policy for the United States to pursue towards Canada. Typical of the New Yorker's efforts was that of June 28th captioned "Reciprocity, False and True." It read in part: "A Commercial Convention is called to assemble at Detroit, July 11th, with express reference to the trade between this country and the adjoining British Colonies. The Canadians, very naturally are the prime movers in the premises. (If Greeley had any evidence for this last statement it can not now be found.) Our Government has given formal notice that it purposes, at the expiration of a year from date, to discontinue the arrangement misnamed Reciprocity and this involves a general stagnation of Canadian trade, a desertion of Canadian railroads by a large share of their present business, and a reduction of some twenty to thirty percent in the current value of most Canadian products. Of course the prospect is not agreeable, and the Canadians have stirred up this Detroit Convention with a hope

1. Sheppard to Becker, June 30, 1865, Taylor Mss.

2. Taylor kept most of his articles in a 'Scrap Book.' I have compared several of his feature articles with those of Sheppard. The similarity is striking; sometimes one might even say that the articles were written by the same man.

that means may thereby be devised of averting its realization. We agree with our Colonial neighbors as to the end, but not as to the means. There ought to be, must be, not partial but perfect Free Trade between them and us; but this can only be achieved through the incorporation of the Colonies with our Union." Medill was of the same opinion. The day the conventioners assembled, after appealing to the boards of trade and chambers of commerce of the great northwestern cities to follow his lead, he told his readers and any chance Canadians who happened to see his journal: "We confess that we are not in a mood to recommend any close commercial or other affiliation with those from whom we have endured the ignominy with which they visited our misfortunes. If any of them want the advantages of our markets, let them come here and do their ploughing if they are farmers or their sawing if they are lumbermen. If any of them are enamoured of our institutions and our laws, the door is open through which they can come in and enjoy them -- tax -- laws and all. But we protest that as alien enemies, they shall not be competitors with our people in our own centers of trade. If they want to abandon their two and six-penny colonial system, send home the sprouts of aristocracy who give tone to their politics, kick out the secession loafers who have made their homes in Montreal, Toronto and Quebec during the war, and adopt Democracy as a principle, annexation will be easy. But no mere partnerships except under an impulsion that few on this side of the Detroit river, and south of the lakes, feel."

The interest aroused by the discussion of the pros and

cons of reciprocity and annexation brought together in Detroit an impressive group of conventioners. Sir Frederick Bruce, newly appointed British Minister at Washington, said of it, "I had no notion it was to be a meeting on such a scale."¹ Even the Chicago Tribune, whose ever-recurring efforts to belittle the necessity for and possible benefits of such a meeting became monotonous, took note of the range of interests represented.² And well it might, for in all there were some four hundred and fifty delegates whose credentials permitted them to take part in the proceedings. In addition there were many other delegations representing special interests who were not admitted officially to the deliberations. The American commercial organizations represented many sectional interests, political influences and economic opinions. There were delegations from as far east as Bangor, Me., as far west as St. Paul and as far south as Cairo, Illinois. Established commercial centers such as New York City were ably represented. Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce from hopeful communities such as Springfield, Ohio, soon to be out-distanced in the race for industrial growth, sent delegates. Central New York, it might be charged, attempted to pack the convention; for each of the cities from Albany to Buffalo sent its quota.³ Of talent there was a variety. Hannibal Hamlin led the Maine interests. James F. Joy, soon to attain fame as a railroad builder, acted as chief host for the Detroiters. Lobbyists, such as the ubiquitous James W. Taylor and Israel T. Hatch, who

1. Bruce to Howe, July 14, 1865, Howe Mss., IV, Letters to Howe, 1864 - 1873, 39 ff.

2. The Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1865.

3. Wilkins to Bruce, XXXX September 7, 1865, G-174, 357 ff.

would plead any cause for a consideration, were in evidence. Among the self-invited, John F. Potter, consul-general of the United States in Canada, was the most conspicuous. Eighteen commercial organizations from Canada, from as far east as Halifax and as far west as London, Canada West, were marshalled in their activities by Joseph Howe of Halifax and C. J. Brydges of Montreal.¹ Keeping in mind the frequently reiterated charges of Greeley and Medill that "the Canadians are the prime movers in the premises," with political sagacity of a high order, Howe and Ryan as spokesmen for the Canadians requested that they be excused from taking part in the permanent organization of the convention and from participating in any of the discussions save those concerning transit and reciprocity.² The agreement to employ this strategy was not attained without a struggle. In the caucus of the Canadians prior to the meeting of the conventioners to effect permanent organization, Brydges and Howe had to whip a recalcitrant 'old goose' or two into line.³ The wisdom of the move was clear to all as the deliberations proceeded.

Permanent organization having been effected, by granting to the delegations of each state the same number of votes as they had representation in Congress -- a victory for New York and

1. The full list of the commercial organizations represented at Detroit is to be found in the Proceedings of the Detroit Commercial Convention held in Detroit, July 11, 12, 13 & 14, 1865, 11 ff. Unfortunately the names of individual members of the various delegations are not included. There is an article in the Detroit Free Press which treats in some detail the outstanding personalities who were present. Detroit Free Press, July 17, 1865.

2. Proceedings of the Detroit Commercial Convention, 14 & 15.

3. Brydges to Macdonald, July 17, 1865, MacDonald Mss., Brydges Correspondence, 60 ff. The vote in the caucus was eight to six for the employment of this strategy.

Pennsylvania despite the braggadocio indulged in by the Chicago Tribune at its attainment -- the delegates proceeded to choose General Walbridge of New York City as permanent chairman. The influence of the agitation of the two Tribunes, the talk of the politicians the previous winter, and the animus for everything British, was apparent in the speech with which he formally opened the convention. After paying his respects to the impressive British and American delegations before him, he stated: "The commercial and business men of this country have suffered their interests too long to be confided to the hands of politicians, and it is now their duty to step forward and exert their own legitimate influence in behalf of peace and the great measures we hope to accomplish in the future." Then with undue haste he surrendered to the politicians, boldly telling his listeners: "And if, gentlemen, from this Convention new sentiments shall spring up between us and them, (the British-Americans) which shall eventuate in still more fraternal relations, I can only say to them that such is the peculiar character of our institutions that while we leave to the States the administration of their local concerns, giving to the general government the requisite power and authority to supervise the whole, our system admits of indefinite expansion -- ... and if hereafter, in the providence of God, they should seek association with us, and help to discharge the debt this rebellion has created, it will relieve us from the anguish we have felt at the course they have heretofore pursued in reference to our internecine war."¹ If Greeley, Medill or Potter had written

1. Proceedings of the Detroit Com., etc., 27.

the speech, their ideas could not have been more clearly trumpeted. The key-note had been sounded. The committees to consider special phases of commercial activities had been appointed and while they deliberated during the next two days, conventioners attending the general sessions were treated to harangues in keeping with the key-noter's speech.¹

The reciprocity committee which took precedence over all others was thoroughly representative. Of the committee five of the members definitely opposed any extension of trading privileges to the Canadians. Three of these were out and out annexationists.² Five more of the members of the committee favored reciprocity to such an extent that they might be called free-traders. At least one of these, when it was to his interest to be so, was an expansionist.³ Of the three remaining, the attitude of two can not be determined; and that of the third, James W. Taylor, is chameleon-like in the extreme. He believed in reciprocity, if his observations in his correspondence with C. J. Brydges and others are to be trusted. At the same time, he contributed articles, published anonymously to be sure, denounc-

1. Speech of Randolph of Chicago, *Ibid.*, 68; Pruyn of New York, 86.

2. Israel T. Hatch of Buffalo, Frederick Fraley of Philadelphia, George C. Burdett of Troy, Henry E. Prentiss and S. H. Dale of Bangor, Me. opposed reciprocity. The two New Yorkers represented canal interests; the Bangorites were henchmen of Hamlin and probably opposed to reciprocity because of the lumber and cod-fishing interests they represented. Fraley represented the one state which had consistently opposed reciprocity. Hatch, Prentiss and Dale were the out and out expansionists.

3. Bridge and Joy of Detroit, Mr. M. R. Waite of Toledo, Daniel Wells of Milwaukee and Bloodgood of New York were the free-traders. The last mentioned had pointed out to Sumner early in January that reciprocity would further expansion. In the convention, however, he did not urge reciprocity as a means to expansion.

ing reciprocity and pointing out that with-holding it would force the Canadians to seek annexation to the United States.¹ With opinion divided as it obviously was, there was a mad scrambling amongst the politicians to influence the committee's action. Hannibal Hamlin, who had refused to serve on the committee as he also had to act as permanent chairman of the convention, shuffled about appealing to the members to stand behind their government in the abrogation of the reciprocity convention.² Consul General

A search of the Joy Manuscripts fails to reveal any data which would make him an expansionist.

1. The attitude of J. L. Taylor of Cincinnati and Lorenzo Sabine of Massachusetts towards reciprocity and annexation can not be determined. After the Detroit Commercial Convention J. W. Taylor was employed by C. J. Brydges of the Grand Trunk to keep him informed of the attitude of the West towards reciprocity and kindred subjects. The rough drafts of many of these letters are in the Taylor Mss. Checking these against the few originals which were sent, and are to be found in the MacDonald Mss., I find that they tally. I think, therefore, that there is little danger in using the rough drafts although I can not be sure that they were always sent to the persons to whom they were addressed. Taylor kept correspondence received and many times the rough drafts can be checked through the replies. Taylor also kept rough drafts of the articles he wrote for the various newspapers which employed him. There is little difference between these and the printed copy which he carefully pasted in his 'Scrap Books.' At one time, this lobbyist of extraordinary parts and the 'good man Friday' of Senator Ramsey of Minnesota was employed by the Grand Trunk, Northern Pacific, St. Paul and Pacific, The Chicago Tribune, The New York Tribune and was all the while Special Agent in either the State or Treasury Departments. His career is sketched by Blegen, T. A. in the Minn. Historical Bulletin, I, 153 ff. The personnel of the committee of reciprocity is listed in the Proceedings of the Detroit Com. Conv., Etc., 33. There is some additional information about the careers of some of these men in Haynes, F. E., The Reciprocity Treaty with Canada of 1854, American Economic Assn Publications, VII, 417 ff.

2. Unfortunately there was no record kept at Detroit of the work done in the committees. For this reason one has to depend almost entirely on the Detroit Free Press, The Detroit Tribune and the Chicago Tribune of July 11 to 15 for knowledge of what happened. However, there is considerable scattered indirect evidence in the 'proceedings' which indicates what Hamlin was doing.

Potter also appeared before the group. Declaring that he was present with the express permission of his government to expound his views, he stated that if reciprocity were withheld from the Canadians such would be their economic depression that they would demand annexation to the United States within two years. Potter then committed the extraordinary blunder of calling together all the American delegates -- although the Canadians were not excluded and some of them attended -- and delivering an harangue of the same general tenor as his statements before the committee.¹ Hamlin and Potter inadvertently had been of inestimable service to the cause of reciprocity for the committee, feeling that they were being bludgeoned into doing the bidding of the politicians, recommended to the convention the appointment by the federal government of commissioners to negotiate a new reciprocity treaty.² While to satisfy the irreconcilables the committee presented to the convention a resolution which indorsed the action of the federal government in abrogating the existing treaty.

When James F. Joy, who was chairman of the committee on reciprocity, reported its recommendations to the convention, he

1. The speeches of Potter were not recorded save in the daily papers. The Chicago Tribune, New York Tribune and Detroit Tribune all hostile to reciprocity and out and out expansion organs record the evidence of what Potter did and said as it is given above. A foot-note in the 'Proceedings' records that Potter's speech was made before the reciprocity committee. I think that there is undoubtedly some correspondence in the State Department Archives concerning this incident for it received wide publicity which continued during the remainder of July. It was not until a week after the convention dispersed that the two Tribunes began to 'white-wash' the incident. The process continued for some time.

2. Brydges and several of the Canadians felt that the activities of Hamlin and Potter had more to do with swinging some of the delegates to a reasonable view of reciprocity than any other force. C. J. Brydges to MacDonald, July 17, 1865, op. cit.

encountered little difficulty in securing the adoption of a resolution showing confidence in the federal government. With its counter-part, the resolution calling upon the government to appoint a commission to negotiate a new treaty, the case was different. Anticipating the main argument of the opposition and suffering from no illusions as to what politicians were about, with boldness and precision, he undermined their position. He pointed out with faultless logic the diverse interests of the United States which reciprocity had served and then turned upon the main argument of the opposition. He told them: "I must allude to an argument which may influence some minds, and which is put forth almost with the importance of official statement, which is, that if no treaty is formed, Canada will suffer so much, that in the course of a few years her government will be revolutionized and she will come into the Federal Union. This is possible; but I reason differently. Men, and particularly whole peoples do not like to be coerced. The more likely course of events would be that which took place before the present Treaty was made. All the questions connected with the fisheries would be thrown open. Collisions would again take place upon the fishing grounds. Irritations would beget irritations. A blow would be struck one side or the other, and the People of the Provinces would rally around the flag of their country, and we should have acquired a war instead of an addition of states."¹ Further to clinch Joy's argument, Mr. John Johnston of Milwaukee, who evidently had a flare for history, told the opposition that

1. Proceedings of the Detroit, etc., 154.

it was just such coercion of Canada as they proposed which had driven the American people to throw off the British yoke in 1776. Bloodgood then tactfully suggested to the expansionists that the territory of the United States was already so extensive that it would require a century to occupy it.¹ Finally, Joseph Howe, speaking for the Canadians, in the most brilliant speech of his long public career according to Trotter, eloquently appealed for a continuance of reciprocity. When he had finished little doubt should have remained as to the attitude of the Provincials towards economic coercion.² Without a dissenting vote, the resolution calling for the negotiation of a new treaty was adopted. And the convention thus ended its deliberations.³

"The Detroit Convention has concluded its labors with a meaningless declaration on the subject of Reciprocity" declared the Chicago Tribune on July 14th. This was the opening gun in an unrelenting campaign designed to vitiate the accomplishments of the Detroit Commercial Convention. Within a few days, the Tribune gloated over the alleged depopulation of Canada and it advised the Canadians to come into the Union by one act rather than piecemeal. In the autumn as it was apparent that the Canadians were neither starving nor even greatly reduced in their state of well-being, the circumstance was laid to the door of

1. Ibid., 135 & 167.

2. I have purposely avoided quoting any part of this speech. Almost every writer who deals with the relations of Canada and the U. S. in this period quotes it liberally. The only full text of it I have ever seen other than the manuscript in the Howe papers is in the Proceedings of the Detroit Com. Conv., 187 rr. However, most writers cite it from the Halifax Citizen.

3. The full text of the resolutions adopted is in the Proceedings of the Detroit Com. Conv., 99 rr.

the Reciprocity Treaty which was still in force. For weeks the Tribune's editorial staff had been conning the British American journals and ferreting out all references to the growth of an annexation party in the Provinces. These they reprinted. But, special pleaders that they were, they failed to reveal that much of this expressed annexation sentiment was a political weapon used to further Canadian confederation. Intermittently Medill published articles written by special correspondents alluding to interviews with prominent Canadians who favored annexation and admitted its inevitability if the treaty were not renewed. Greeley, too, followed this practice. His Tribune's fight to prevent renewal of reciprocity and to further expansion was neither abated nor modified by the action of the commercial men at Detroit. The constitution of the United States, Greeley contended, was the only reciprocity treaty which should be given the Canadians. This, he believed, they would not be willing to accept in a fortnight; but within a few years or as soon as it was apparent to them that the Americans meant to erect high tariff walls against them and that the mother country would be powerless to assist them, then, they would knock at the door for admission into the Union.

The reaction of some other journals in the United States to the work done at Detroit was decidedly friendly. The strictly commercial papers, everywhere, commented on the wisdom of negotiating a new treaty. Typical of these was the New York Commercial Journal which observed that "The proceedings of the Detroit Commercial Convention the last week are evidently des-

tinged to exercise a salutary influence both on the commercial and political world Secretary Seward may complete his claims upon the gratitude of his countrymen by entering upon negotiations with England and Canada in the spirit of the resolutions adopted by the convention." The Detroit Free Press pointed out the absurdity of the Chicago Tribune's policy of denouncing Canada and the Canadians in one breath and expressing a desire to annex them in another. For this and its other 'heretical views' which favored reciprocity, the Tribune called the Free Press a "Copperhead Canadian sheet" and found its activities most unpatriotic. Nevertheless the Detroit daily continued to pound away at the folly of cancelling the treaty and throughout the summer and autumn kept the subject alive in hope that Congress might rescind its action of the previous January.

Greatly encouraged by the spirit of fairness and cooperation with which the representatives of the merchants of the United States had met them at Detroit, the Canadians' hope for the renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty revived. To be sure, the Canadians were vexed at what they thought was the expressed attitude of the Washington administration through its representative Mr. Potter. It was only with difficulty that the citizens of Montreal were restrained from circulating petitions and organizing public meetings to demand Potter's recall.¹ But, ignoring the Potter incident officially the Canadian government convinced itself that the Detroit Commercial Convention "must have a good effect at Washington, as showing the government that the

1. John Rose to MacDonald, July 15, 1865, MacDonald Mss., Rose Correspondence, 8 ff.

mercantile interests of the whole country are determined to have reciprocal trade with Canada."¹ Sir Frederick Bruce wrote to Joseph Howe: "If the Americans see that the Provinces go together and that while willing to trade and be good friends, they will not be coerced, I think the treaty will be carried against protectionists and political influence."² With a view to securing the treaty, Bruce entered into preliminary conversations with Mr. Seward. The latter, forgetting his promises of early March "to enter into negotiations for a remodelling of the Reciprocity Treaty as the season advanced" "made repeated references to the irritation still existing against Canada in the public mind from events arising during the war, and said that if official application were now made to the American Government for a renewal of negotiations respecting the Reciprocity Treaty it would be met by refusal."³ During a visit to Washington in August, probably on other business though that can not now be determined, A. T. Galt, Canadian minister of finance, broached the question of a renewal of reciprocity to the Secretary of the Treasury, only to be met with the same sort of rebuff which Bruce had received. Here the matter rested until Congress assembled in December and Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick sent commissioners to Washington who hoped to negotiate a new treaty.

1. C. J. Brydges to MacDonald, July 17, 1865, op. cit.

2. July 25, 1865, Howe Mss., IV, 43 ff.

3. Report of a Committee of the Executive Council & Memo on the Subject of the Renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty of the U. S. of America, 6 & 7, C. A. Pamphlet No. 2631, Bruce entered into the conversations on July 22, 1865.

Before the provincial commissioners¹ arrived in Washington, the government of the United States had found a way to sidestep the issues which would be raised by opening negotiations to modify the reciprocity arrangement. Secretary McCulloch in his annual report to Congress for 1865 said: "The people of the United States can not consent to be taxed as producers while those outside of our boundaries exempt from our burdens, shall be permitted as competitors to have free access to our markets."² Anticipating that the main objection to be offered to remodelling the old agreement was to concern itself with the heavy internal taxes, the commissioners tarried in Boston to discuss the problem with David A. Wells.³ They found Wells friendly and sympathetic towards the propositions they offered.⁴ He promised to write Sumner asking him to use his influence to secure a modified

1. A. T. Galt, minister of finance and W. P. Howland, postmaster general represented Canada; A. J. Smith, and W. A. Henry, attorneys general of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia respectively were the other commissioners.

2. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December 4, 1865, Reports of the Heads of Departments, 1865, 206.

3. The two Tribunes had given McCulloch's report considerable publicity and had gloated over the fact that it put the possibility of renewing reciprocity beyond question.

4. "Mr. Galt, the Canadian Minister of Finance, Mr. Smith the Premier of New Brunswick, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, and others from the Provinces are here on their way to Washington to confer about future commercial relations. I have had a conference with these gentlemen and so desirous are they of securing their access to our markets, that I feel assured they will offer propositions in return which it would be unwise for us to disregard -- especially such as relate to an equalization of the Provincial Tariffs and Excise with our own, with a view of preventing contraband trade -- a measure which, it seems to me, would be about equivalent to annexation. Mr. Galt will seek an early interview with you. Allow me to urge on you the importance of considering his propositions; and as a personal matter may I ask you to afford him opportunities for becoming acquainted with such other gentlemen connected with the Government as he may desire." Wells to Sumner, (undated), *op. cit.*

treaty. Burnley had already done the same.¹ At Washington, Mr. Seward being absent, the commissioners opened negotiations with Mr. McCulloch. The latter, probably safe-guarding himself, invited Mr. Morrill to be present at the interview. McCulloch told the commissioners that "the House of Representatives regarded a commercial treaty as an infringement of their constitutional rights, and would not entertain it; that whatever further had to be done in regard to the treaty between the two countries must be by legislation."² Unsatisfied, Mr. Galt sought out Mr. Seward upon his return, who readily agreed with his cabinet colleague. The commissioners, therefore, betook themselves to the House, where after several discussions with the Ways and Means Committee they learned that the only reciprocal arrangement which would be acceded to was one of a legislative nature repealable without notice. The arrangement, as George Brown of the Toronto Globe put it, would keep Canadian industry and commerce dependent upon the whims of Congress. Further Brown observed that the ministers were wise to drop the negotiations at this point, for the obvious intent of the American government was to make the Canadians "forget their loathing of annexation, and submit to be 'absorbed' in the American Republic."³ This, high praise from an enemy of the government.

Congress was indeed in a perplexing position. An important

1. J. Hume Burnley to Sumner, September 11, 1865, Sumner Mss., CXLI, 38.

2. From an oral report made by A. T. Galt to the Executive Council of Canada, in Report of a Committee of the Executive Council, etc., 6.

3. Reprinted from the Toronto Globe in the Detroit Free Press, February 10, 1866.

and powerful element of the nation's population had demonstrated unmistakably its desire for a continuance of unhampered trade with the British Provinces. The administration had dodged and thrown the problem of providing facilities for trade upon Congress. Further, this Congress, elected when hatred for Britain and the Canadians was at its height, was in no mood to grant privileges to the sons of Britain, for according to a rather sympathetic observer, as the leading politicians congregated at Washington, "they indulged in a good deal of bitter hostility to any international Treaty, urging as a reason that in their 'time of trial' England and Canada had been so sympathetic with the South and aided her in carrying on the Rebellion, that now the North had no wish to continue a Treaty which seemed so advantageous to Canada."¹ The same writer felt, however, that "this feeling" would "soon pass away" and some arrangement to maintain the trade be agreed upon. How mistaken this view proved to be is apparent from the abundant record left by Congress. The session had scarcely opened before Chandler and others introduced petitions from 'The Citizens of Michigan' and other groups of equally indefinite political influence, demanding that the trade with the British Provinces be discontinued.² Sumner, too, was preparing for any possible efforts to renew reciprocity. He sent off to a lesser official of the Canadian government for the statistics of the

1. Scott to MacDonald, Dec. 4, 1865, MacDonald Mss., Fenian I, 333 ff.

2. The Congressional Globe, 39th, 1st, I, 184, 242, 322 & 332. Chandler also introduced a resolution demanding non-intercourse with Great Britain and all her dependencies until she had settled claims for the 'Alabama damages.' Ibid, 227.

Canadian-American Trade.¹ This -- before it was clear that McCulloch and Morrill with the possible connivance of Mr. Seward indicated that the House was to deal with the problem.

The representatives delayed their action until the last possible moment, when Mr. Morrill attempted, half-heartedly, to secure the adoption of a bill which might have maintained a semblance of reciprocity.² Joseph Howe, an acute observer who watched the debate on the bill from the moment Morrill introduced it on March 6th until it failed of passage a few days later, felt that it was defeated because many minds were influenced against it by a feeling of hostility "growing out of the depredations of the Alabama and Shenandoah cruisers and the southern raids across the

1. In transmitting the data to Sumner his correspondent observed: "I see with a great deal of satisfaction that our delegates to Washington are coming back without having effected anything. So much the better for our future. Many months will not elapse now before our people will perceive how our political and commercial position is illogical and absurd. How will it be pretended that we must do without you when we can not get along without you. Since the last news came over we have seen many a long face among your enemies of years past." Lessaulles to Sumner, Feb. 1, 1866, Sumner Mss., CXLI, 107.

2. Morrill doomed the bill to failure by his opening remarks. He claimed that the treaty which had established the trade he sought to protect had been extorted from the United States by fear of war with Britain and the delusion that favor would beget favor; that it denied to the lower branch of Congress its constitutional right of controlling the raising of revenue; that it failed to protect American lumbermen, miners, wool-growers, grain-farmers and manufacturers. He insisted that his bill, House No. 337, would protect these interests and at the same time would tax the Canadians for the privilege of trading in the U. S. Moreover he claimed that neither fear of war with Britain nor the delusion that she was a friendly power need guide their action; for now at the first sign of war, the British Provinces would be annexed, while the activities of John Bull during the recent war demonstrated his hostility. Each member of Congress with a petty interest to serve who spoke subsequent to this introduction, caught up and amplified Morrill's refrain. Soon 'Manifest Destiny' was unleashed once more. See remarks of Congressmen Morrill, Pike, Thomas, Kelly, Wentworth, Spalding, Phelps, Brooks and Schenck in the

Canadian frontier ... that others forming an exaggerated estimate of the Military and naval power of this country, and of its ability to shake the allegiance of the Northern Provinces by an illiberal commercial system were disposed to try that experiment, while a very large proportion of the members of Congress absorbed in questions bearing on the treatment of the emancipated negroes and the reconstruction of the government knew but little of the importance and value of the Northern trade."¹

With the failure of Congress to provide for continued reciprocal trade with British North America, reciprocity and annexation definitely came to a parting of the ways. The Canadians who were most ardent in seeking reciprocity were not annexationists. When their commissioners returned home after having met with the peremptory refusal of the United States to continue reciprocity, they set about meeting the situation as best they might. A delegation was sent off to the Caribbean and Mediterranean to interest the peoples of these regions in the purchase of colonial commodities.² Plans were pushed forward to give each colony, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and the two Canadas easier communication with one another.³ And the friends of the confederation scheme

Congressional Globe, 39th, 1st, II, 1210, 1212, 1219, 1220, 1241 - 1250 & 1344.

1. Joseph Howe to the Earl of Clarendon, March 20, 1866, Howe Mss., Fishery Commission Correspondence (1860-1866), XII, 479 ff.

2. Trotter, Canadian Federation, 127; Cf. also, Monck to Cardwell, April 14, 1866, G 465.

3. C. J. Brydges in the spring of 1866 published a pamphlet which was widely circulated in which he pointed out to the provincials that intercolonial trade would absorb a goodly part of that previously carried on with the States. At the same time he pressed for the immediate construction of the intercolonial railway.

seized the opportunity which the 'Japanese commercial policy' of their neighbor gave them to push their plans to a successful conclusion. Meantime demagogues south of the border considerably furthered Canadian union by continuing to toy with expansionist ideas.

Chapter III

NORTHWARD EXPANSION AND AMERICAN POLITICS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1866

After the efforts of the British colonials had failed to secure renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty and Congress had flatly refused to provide for reciprocal trade by favorable legislation, the question of annexation and expansion temporarily went into eclipse. Throughout April and May, 1866, save for a desultory comment here and there -- which today would be termed 'filler' -- the press of the United States ignored the question. Early in June, however, expansionist discussion was revived and during the next few months it remained a vital issue, for because of the exigencies of the political situation in the States, the radical Republican party, seeking to gain supremacy over the conservative wing with its sprinkling of Democrats could not afford to ignore the 'vote-getting' possibilities to be derived from the espousal of expansionist notions. Four circumstances contributed to keep the question in the forefront of political discussion. First, each of the political groups aforementioned wished to gain a sufficient majority of the members to be elected to Congress in the autumn so that it might determine the policy to be followed in the reconstruction of the southern states. Second, the Fenian Brotherhood desired by a forcible dismemberment of the British Empire to right the political wrongs from which the Irish felt they had suffered for centuries. Third, the West hoped for more abundant land and easier and cheaper means of

communication with the markets of northwestern Europe. Finally, the manufacturers of New England and New York wanted greater facility for the expansion of trade in the adjacent British territory. Because the West, New England and New York could best be satisfied if the whole of British North America were annexed, the radical Republican leaders, quick to realize the necessity of securing votes which had been alienated by the policy pursued concerning reciprocity, shifted political fences to embrace the hopes of the expansionists. Likewise, these same leaders sensed the advantage to be gained by adopting the cause of the Fenians as their own. Hence, when the Fenians raided Canada and New Brunswick early in June, the radical Republicans, who had been covertly encouraging the growth of the Irish Republic, openly evinced their approval.

The Fenian Brotherhood was born in the decade prior to the outbreak of the American Civil War. It was a quasi-political-international body pledged to effect the liberation of Ireland. The American branch of this organization, already important by 1864, had experienced a rapid growth which continued until in 1866 the society boasted a membership of approximately one hundred thousand out of the three million Irish-Americans. The members were organized into circles in the urban centers of the northern states. By late 1865 the Brotherhood was sufficiently strong to constitute itself the Irish Republic with all the paraphernalia of statehood. President, Secretaries of War, Treasury and Civil Affairs, Senate and Congress, flag and army, were

created.¹ To its members, the Irish Republic was a formidable power lacking only in territory. To remedy this defect the orators of the organization toured the United States exhorting congregations of the Irish to invest in the bond issues of the Republic so that funds might be provided to enable the executive officers to carry forward a plan for securing a land over which the emerald flag with its ornamental gold harp might be unfurled. The design which emerged from the maze of factional debates and disputes which pervaded the councils of the Brotherhood during 1865 was indeed an elaborate one.² It called for the sudden

1. Sir Edward M. Archibald, consul-general for Her Majesty's government in the United States, became vitally interested in the activities of the Fenian Brotherhood, late in 1864. His government permitted him to draw on the 'Secret Service fund' so that he might more readily secure information. His letters to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the British Minister in Washington, and the Governor-General of Canada constitute a supremely valuable source for the study of Fenianism. At one time he had as an informer the Assistant-Secretary of War of the Irish Republic. Archibald's reports to his government, which I have checked against the comment concerning the Fenian Brotherhood which appeared in the press and the reports of the Special Agents of the Canadian government who spied on the Fenians, disclose the accuracy of the Consul's information. Edith Archibald, the biographer of Sir Edward, briefly but unsatisfactorily treats the activities of her father in watching the Fenians. Far more valuable than her treatment are the letters of the Consul in the Archibald Manuscripts as yet uncatalogued but preserved in the Canadian Archives.

2. The first indication that the Fenians intended to invade Canada was an outgrowth of the convention of the Brotherhood held in Chicago in January, 1865. The Chicago Tribune, January 26, 1865, gives the detail of the beginning of this plan. From this point forward the evolution of the scheme set forth in the text is easily traced through the newspapers and impeccable documentary evidence. The more important items in the latter are: Seward to Burnley, Feb. 8, 1865, G-235, 83 ff; Buchanan to MacDonald, Oct. 28, 1865, MacDonald Mss., Fenian I, 162 ff; C. Alleyn to MacDonald, Oct. 31, 1865, Ibid, 178 ff; Archibald to Sir John Michel, Nov. 1, 1865, G-236 (There are several letters from Archibald to Michel which were obviously placed in this folio after it was catalogued. These letters are therefore un-numbered in the paging of the folio. Duplicates of them are to be found in the Archibald Mss.); John Creighton to MacDonald, Nov. 9, 1865 MacDonald Mss., Fenian I, 228; R. N. Scott to MacDonald, Dec. 9, 1865, Ibid, 348 ff;

descent of the Republic's army upon some vantage point in the British Provinces easily accessible to the States. The lodgement effected, the Irish Republic's government would move in and recognition as belligerents would be extended from the Federal government at Washington, and the complete humiliation of John Bull would be but a matter of weeks, for privateers would be fitted out to sweep British commerce from the ocean -- as the Alabama and Shenandoah had recently served that of the Americans. Great Britain and the United States would become involved in war and as the United Kingdom attempted to save her colonial empire in the Western Hemisphere, the Fenians would successfully revolutionize Ireland. Archibald's agents learned of these plans and carefully followed their development.

The opportunities of the Irish Republic for recruiting an army to carry through the design agreed upon by the leaders, were furthered to no small extent by the post-war conditions in the United States. The recent Irish, unlike the Scandanavian and German immigrants had settled for the most part in the industrial areas of the North. There, it was possible for the Brotherhood to recruit a soldiery. Evidence is abundant showing the formation of volunteer companies who nightly drilled in the

Archibald to Lord Monck, Dec. 12, 1865, Ibid., IV, 184 ff; Bowmanville to MacDonald, March 16, 1866, Ibid., II, 214 ff. There is also an interesting and revealing article in the London Times reprinted in the Chicago Tribune, June 8, 1865. The O'Mahoney faction wished to invade Ireland directly, while the W. R. Roberts faction, which slowly gained ascendancy in the Brotherhood throughout 1865 favored the plan which was finally adopted. O'Mahoney, to prevent a complete split in the Fenian ranks was finally won over to the plan -- though after its failure he repudiated it as well as the political philanderings of Roberts.

streets of the cities. When it was apparent even to the most skeptical that the rebellion of the southern states had been crushed and the Union host was rapidly being disbanded, enlistments in the Fenian army gained impetus. The Irish volunteer returning to the industrial center from whence he had enlisted, found himself facing unemployment due to the immediate post-war readjustments of the factories. Naturally, he gravitated to an easy and familiar berth in the army of the Irish Republic. One observer watching the growth of the Fenian army reported in the spring of 1866, "The returned soldiers and officers are unable now to settle down to civil life and against that bug-bear England they would most willingly enlist their very souls."¹ The inducements held out to the discharged Union soldier were large, as a hand-bill circulated in the New York and Boston areas indicates. It reads: "Volunteers for Canada One Hundred Pounds Bounty! 200 Acres of Land. All Honorably Discharged Soldiers, and all British Subjects, desirous of locating themselves in Canada will receive one hundred Pounds Bounty and a Certificate of Two Hundred Acres of Land. Conditions explained at Head-Quarters of Annexation League, Room No. 4, No. 31 Exchange Street. Late Commissioned Officers of the United States are particularly requested to call."² Munitions to supply these

1. David McKinnon to MacDonald, April 11, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian II, 283 ff. As early as May, 1865, the Fenians began recruiting their army. See Archibald to Bruce, May 13 & 18, 1865, G-164, 12 & 37.

2. Hand-bill in MacDonald Mss., Fenian III, 922. General E. A. Cruikshank in a conversation with me during the summer of 1929 said that eye-witnesses had told him that on the eve of the raid on Fort Erie maps of Upper Canada were displayed on the walls of the rendezvous of the Fenians in Buffalo. One of the Irish

men were easily procurable, for as the Quartermaster General of the United States disposed of the surplus of small arms and ammunition accumulated in 1864, the Brotherhood became a heavy purchaser.¹ Parcels of these munitions were cached in depots along the frontier of Canada and New Brunswick. Others were shipped off to Ireland, with the connivance of the United States customs officials, at least so the British Consul General thought.² Meanwhile as the army drilled and all was set in order for the descent on Canada delegations of Fenians called upon the political leaders of both parties in Washington to secure guarantees of non-interference with their plans.

The Fenians who called upon President Johnson, members of his cabinet and prominent congressmen, in the spring of 1866, were well received. The political situation was opportune for them, for the extreme Republicans and President Johnson with his following of conservative Republicans and Democrats had become involved in an intense wrangle over the policy to be pursued in the reconstruction of the southern states. Already each group was looking to the congressional elections of the autumn with the hope that it would secure a sufficient majority of the congressmen to be elected so that its policy might triumph. The Fenian

orators invited the raiders to come forward and select the Canadian farms which they wished to occupy as their own.

1. John Creighton to MacDonald, Op. Cit., Alex McLeod to MacDonald, March 19, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian II, 243 ff.

2. "The shipment of arms from this or any other American port in barrels or packages representing ordinary merchandise, is easily practicable; and if brought to the notice of subordinate officers of the U. S. Government would probably be connived at." Archibald to Monck, Sept. 16, 1865, G-236. There is also a copy of this correspondence in the Archibald Mss.

organization because of its political character could exert pressure upon its members. Hence, neither the President's party nor the extreme Republicans could afford to do or say anything which would give umbrage to the Brotherhood. President Johnson when approached concerning his attitude towards the project of the Fenians stated that he sympathized deeply with any people as they struggled to gain republican institutions.¹ Probably it was this which led General Heffernan to observe later that the Brotherhood had been given to understand that the United States government would not interfere with them.² Implicitly the general's statement is well substantiated, but there is little evidence upon which to base an explicit understanding of the sort which his statement indicates. The Secretary of State, who would obviously be consulted concerning plans such as the Fenians intended executing, seems to have encouraged them but with carefully stipulated reservations. An Albany friend reported to Agle R. Gowan that "there is a perfect understanding between Mr. Seward and two of the Fenian chiefs, that they, (the Fenians) are to be allowed to carry on all the preparations they please, and to keep up as much excitement as they please, so as to frighten the Canadian Government, and compel them (the Government,) to keep up a strong force, to guard against apprehended danger -- that this course will incur a fearful expenditure, and will force us to increase our Taxes, so as to prevent inducements to smuggling,

1. From the testimony of W. R. Roberts, president of the Irish Republic, given after he was taken in custody by the United States in June, 1866. The testimony is printed in the Detroit Free Press, June 19, 1866.

2. MacDonald, J., Troublous Times in Canada, 118.

and in the end lead to a general wish for Annexation, to prevent the continuance of excitement and increasing Taxes. He says Mr. Seward has agreed that they may do anything they please short only of actual invasion. And that there is a perfect understanding between two of their Leaders and the American Government -- one desires to have Ireland, and the other Canada, and they have mutually agreed to take all necessary steps, if possible peaceably, to effect both objects."¹ The British and Canadian governments were apprised of the attitude of Mr. Seward as some of the official correspondence indicates. The Officer Administering the Government of Canada in the absence of Lord Monck, the governor general, advised the Canadian Attorney General that the American Secretary of State, because of factional bitterness existing in the government and because American public opinion condoned acts of hostility directed at the British,² could not interfere with the Fenians until they had actually committed an overt act.³ On

1. Gowan to MacDonald, March 19, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian II, 250 ff.

2. In this connection Archibald observed: "It is most discreditable that the U. S. should allow officers actually holding commissions in their regular service to attend the meetings now being held here, (New York City) and take part in the declaration of, as well as preparation for, war on Great Britain. But there is some show of reason in their non-interference -- Directly one denounces these assemblages in the presence of the most respectable and Anti-Fenian Americans, one is met with the Liverpool Southern Aid Society - and Rebel sympathy of meetings, etc. in England; and probably to meddle with these miscreants authoritatively would only give them importance, and sympathy on the part of thousands now utterly indifferent to them. ... I think the U. S. Govt. consider the best course is to give them rope, and they will hang themselves." Archibald to MacDonald, Jan. 23, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian II, 6 ff.

3. Sir John Michel to MacDonald, Jan. 22, 1866, Ibid., 19. W. R. Roberts in his testimony (cited above) admitted that the Fenians knew that Mr. Seward had been in continuous communication with Sir Frederick Bruce and the Canadian government concerning

May 31, 1866, A. T. Galt, returning from an interview with David A. Wells, reported that the latter had told him that "the policy of a part if not the whole of their (the U. S.) Govt. was to drive us into annexation, and that the Fenians would be used for this purpose."¹ If Mr. Seward's known interest in expansion is kept in mind, the full significance of the evidence supplied by Gowan, Michel, Archibald, Roberts and Galt is apparent. Expansion was having its heyday.

The Irish Republic, acting under such 'carte blanche' as it understood President Johnson and Mr. Seward had given it, sent its army -- some three thousand strong -- across the northern frontier on June 1, 1866. The original plan of the Republic had called for a series of simultaneous raids along the frontier from Eastport, Maine, to Detroit, Michigan;² but for some inexplicable reason, the scheme had gone awry. Once on British soil at Fort Erie, Canada, and in New Brunswick near St. Albans, Vermont, the Fenian hosts were met by an overwhelming force of Canadian volunteers and British regulars, who promptly drove them back into the United States.³ There they were taken into custody

the projected raid.

1. Galt to MacDonald, May 31, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Confederation VI, 328 ff.

2. Col. A. Brooks to Col. Macdougall, Jan. 26, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian II, 51.

3. The official report of the raid is found in Monck to Cardwell, June 14, 1866, G-465, 465 ff. The best account written by an eye-witness is that of Major George T. Denison, The Fenian Raid on Fort Erie; with an account of the Battle of Ridgeway, Canadian Archives, Pamphlet No., 2725. Cruikshank, General E. A., The Fenian Raid of 1866, Welland County Historical Society Papers and Records, II, 9 ff, is an excellent military account. It is based on the military records in the Canadian Archives. The Canadians had commenced preparations for the raids as early as November, 1865. The development of these preparations can be

by officers of the Federal government sent by the President to enforce the neutrality laws.¹ They arrested the leaders, confiscated arms and munitions of war and hurried the remnants of the 'fighting Irish' away from the frontier. The raid, in its military aspects, had turned out to be a farce. Politically, however, it brought the Fenian Brotherhood into a prominence hitherto un-

traced: Michel to Cardwell, Nov. 10, 1865, G-465, 386 ff; Monck to Cardwell, March 9, 1866, Ibid., 440 ff; Monck to Admiral F. Hope, March 9, 1866, G-248, 229 ff; MacDonald communicated with C. J. Brydges of the Grand Trunk, Thomas Reynolds of the Ottawa and Prescott Railway Co., and Joseph Price of the Great Western with regard to the possibility of Fenians using their lines and rolling stock to gain entrance into Canada. Each promised complete cooperation with the government and guaranteed rolling stock to be placed at the command of the government whenever the threatened raid developed. Each assured Sir John that the gauge of his railroad differed from that used in the United States. MacDonald to Brydges, Reynolds and Price, Nov. 17 & 28, 1865, MacDonald Mss., Fenian II, 23 to 43.

1. "On June 6th President Johnson, urged on by the British Ambassador, issued a proclamation ordering the strict enforcement of the neutrality laws. This tardy action led Governor-General Monck to write to Secretary of State Seward, stating that the United States government 'is entitled to my thanks, which I beg that you will convey to them for vigorously and faithfully putting their laws into force against the Fenians after the invasion of Canada had actually taken place.' Sarcasm is not usually a characteristic of diplomatic correspondence and its presence here is significant of the anger felt by Canadians in regard to what they considered to be the criminal negligence of the American officials. Once taken, however, the action of the American government was temporarily effective and for this the British minister made suitable and even cordial acknowledgements." Keenleyside, Canada and the United States, 151. I think this interpretation places undue emphasis on one document. All of the other communications written by Monck before and after the incident do not show peevishness at the course pursued by the Washington government. Moreover, this interpretation leaves out of account the fact that friends of confederation in the Provinces, particularly in New Brunswick, welcomed the raids as they indubitably furthered the confederation movement. In this latter connection see: S. L. Tilley to MacDonald, April 17, 20 & 21, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Confederation VI, 254, 272 & 275; Howe to Bruce, April 23, 1866, Howe Mss., IX, 36 ff.

achieved, for throughout the rest of the summer and early autumn the extreme Republicans rallied their forces in support of the Fenian expansionists.

The first indication that the radicals were ready to further the designs of the Fenians and incidentally to embarrass President Johnson and his embryonic party, appeared in the action of certain members of his cabinet when confronted with the crisis grown out of the Fort Erie raid. There was a concerted attempt upon the part of Mr. Seward and Attorney General Speed to throw the onus of enforcing the neutrality laws upon Secretary of the Navy, Welles. The navy chief felt that this was an attempt to discredit President Johnson and the administration without involving any of the truly 'Republican' members of the cabinet. Stanton flatly refused to have anything to do with the 'Irish question.'¹ This bickering caused a two days delay in settling upon a policy, Welles refusing the while to let the Navy Department be used to enforce the neutrality laws. Speed was really responsible for their enforcement and when he took action by issuing a proclamation, he worded it so as to discredit the administration.² Both the President and Mr. Welles commented at the time on the 'mischievous intent' of the Attorney General and the former promptly modified Speed's proclamation by one of his own. The Republicans of the cabinet, nevertheless, had accomplished their purpose; the damage had been done. Already other

1. Earlier in the year, an attempt to decide upon a policy to be adopted for handling the 'Fenian menace' had been blocked by Stanton. Welles, G., The Diary of, II, 518 ff.

2. Horace Greeley excoriated Johnson for permitting the 'Speed proclamation' to be issued. The New York Daily Tribune, June 7, 1866.

powerful elements of the party were denouncing the administration¹

Horace Greeley found it as easy to condemn the administration for enforcing the neutrality laws as he had previously to villify the Irish Republic as a despicable nuisance.² A sample of the 'blarney' served up by the Tribune editor laid the entire failure of the Fenian expedition at the door of Andrew Johnson. "The President," Greeley said, "might have remembered that the Fenians were struggling for an independent nationality, and have followed that exact course of proceedings which was pursued by Great Britain during the Rebellion towards the United States, recognizing both the Fenians and the British as belligerents, and observing between them a strict neutrality. He chose, instead, to treat the Fenians as malefactors and Great Britain as a power that must be conciliated and for whose behoof the armies of the United States were to be employed as a Canadian police"³ Medill also criticized the administration. His condemnation, however, was for the laxity in the enforcement of the neutrality laws. He felt, at this time, that the southerners, lately in rebellion, were responsible for the Fenian raids. He held that "the upshot of the Fenian raid at Buffalo, so far from being a Fenian failure

1. Thus far Welles is the only source I have found which relates the attitude of individual cabinet members towards the Fenians. Welles, G., Op. Cit., 518 to 524. It is probable that the correspondence of Seward, Stanton and Speed, if any can be found, will reveal additional information. I think it likely that Speed might have communicated with T. T. Bannon, senator of the Irish Republic from Louisville, Ky., and Stanton with J. W. Fitzgerald also a senator of the Republic from Cincinnati, Ohio.

2. Greeley condemned the Fenians prior to June, 1866 and heaped much criticism on the administration for permitting them to organize as fully as they had. The New York Daily Tribune, Oct. 3, 1865 & Nov. 16, 1865.

3. The New York Daily Tribune, June 12, 1866.

.... is the most absolute success they could have hoped for; their main object being undoubtedly to involve America into a war with England, and set the whole American people to fighting for the conquest of Canada, the freedom of Ireland, and the dismemberment of the British Empire. True, Great Britain would be very reluctant to go to war with the United States under circumstances which would be likely to precipitate Ireland into a rebellion. But it may well be doubted whether such a war would not afford quite as good an opportunity for the renewal of the southern rebellion against the United States, as for a formidable rebellion in Ireland. ... Such a war might, indeed, lead to the conquest of Canada. But it might lead also to the dismemberment of the United States."¹

The radical Republicans in the Congress then sitting seized the opportunity which Johnson's enforcement of the neutrality laws gave them to make political capital. Individual members with Irish constituents to serve, showered the body with petitions calling upon the government to secure the release of Fenians in Canadian and British custody.² Mr. Schenck and others promptly urged the study and possible thorough revision of the neutrality laws.³ Chandler made a similar move in the Senate. His motion, however, was lost. Mr. Spalding, with no apparent difficulty, secured approval of a resolution calling upon the President to drop the prosecution being carried forward against the Fenian marauders

1. The Chicago Tribune, June 7, 1866.

2. The Congressional Globe, 39th, 1st, V, 4047, 4048 & 4057.

3. Ibid., IV, 3086.

who had been apprehended as they returned from Canada.¹ Finally, after a barrage of oratory, wherein the 'old refrain' of the wrongs done to the United States by Great Britain was repeated again and again, the House, knowing full well as the indirect evidence in the Globe shows, that the Senate would not act, gave notice that if the Fenians should again make an incursion into Canada they should not be interfered with. This was done by the simple process of redrafting the neutrality laws. The Fenians placed great store in the action of Congress as a letter from a senator of the Irish Republic to the President of the Senate reveals. "I confess to have faith in Congress", he wrote, "believing their action will be mainly based with a view to personal interest -- but no matter. If, by a concert of action throughout the country on the part of our people we could have every Congressman to be elected this fall pledged to a specific line of policy in our behalf, there is something to hope for -- in fact, it is our only salvation. Being of the opinion that the radical majority in Congress will prove themselves the friends of liberty and pass a resolution similar to that of Schenck's, I am strongly in favor of presenting a bold front for the present. Every possible influence should be brought to bear in Washington. Promise them anything and everything in the name of the Irish people. You cannot go too far on this point for our countrymen in every portion of the Union will make good our promises provided Congress will do anything for us."² In

1. Ibid., V, 4048.

2. J. W. Fitzgerald to James Gibbons, June 25, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian III, 667 ff.

Milwaukee appreciation of the congressional attitude was more openly expressed, for there a flaming poster advised the Brotherhood: "Glorious News! Congress speaks for the Fenians A Grand Mass Meeting of the Citizens of Milwaukee, will be held on Wednesday Evening June 13, at 8 o'clock at the City Hall Square For the purpose of taking action with and endorsing the men in the field. The Fenians under Gen. Spear and Col. Scanlan of the fighting 9th Massachusetts have whipped the 'Red Coats' in two engagements -- the Neutrality Laws to be repealed by Congress, and the Fenians to be recognized as belligerents. Irishmen! Your Brothers are being shot and hung by English officials in Canada. Take action now or never, and you will soon be a Liberated and Independent Nation. Distinguished American and Irish speakers will attend."¹

Each Irish fete day throughout the summer was made the occasion for harangues delivered to the assembled sons of Erin, concerning the iniquities of 'John Bull' and his allies, President Johnson and the Democractic party. Governor Oglesby of Illinois told Fenians of Chicago that had he been President when they raided Canada he would not have interfered with them and advised them not to abandon their objective. Speaker Colfax and General John A. Logan were also active for each had a constituency which embraced many Irish Voters.² In the East, particularly in the New York and Boston areas, where the Irish population was heavily concentrated, Conkling, Banks and others improved their political fortunes by telling the Irish patriots

1. MacDonald Mss., Fenian III, 636.

2. Beale, H. K., The Critical Year, 302 & 303.

that the Republican party was ready to help them. Every utterance was an invitation to the Fenians to try their hand once more at seizing Canada; every burst of oratory, a denunciation of Great Britain; every petty grievance that the United States had ever cherished against Britain a bill of indictment.¹

Encouraged by the action of the congressional radicals and the seductive promises held out to them in campaign speeches, the Fenians continued to threaten the conquest of Canada. Roberts, president of the Irish Republic, who was "perambulating the country and making speeches advising the Irish to cast their votes at the next election for the Republicans" used as his chief appeal the conquest of Canada and the promise of the Republicans to repeal the neutrality laws.² When the press of Canada objected and suggested that the Canadians threaten the United States with war unless the Fenian menace were stopped, Medill, who had always been greatly impressed by the military power of the Federal government released one of his characteristic thunderbolts. He told the colonials that "a declaraction of war against the United States would accomplish the annexation of Canada to this Republic within six weeks thereafter. The British

1. Joseph Howe looking at the spectacle observed: "A very fair proportion of the mercantile, professional and highly educated classes admire or are friendly to the Mother Country, and a few of the public men venture at times to do her justice, but when men like Sumner, who has travelled in England and knows her well -- Bancroft who has been minister there, and knows her better, and Banks and Wilson who are well informed and able men, are compelled at times to bow to the prevailing sentiment, in violation of good taste and international comity, the strength of the current may be readily gauged." Howe to Lord Stanley, Aug. 17, 1868, Howe Mss., IX, 82 ff.

2. The Detroit Free Press, July 7, 1866.

Provinces would be invaded as quickly as the President could issue a proclamation calling out three hundred thousand veteran soldiers, and they could rush together by regiments, and be conveyed to the Canadian border by rail and water. These veterans, under Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, Hancock and Meade, would rush over the Provinces like a tornado, sweeping away all resistance as so many straws."¹ A week later, in a more pacific mood, expressing much regret that the Fenians had frightened the Canadians he prescribed a remedy for this fear inspired by a realized lack of defense equipment. "Our commisseration for our British neighbors is sincere and profound. We know of but one means by which they can protect themselves from the terrors of Fenian invasion, and restore their nerves to their accustomed tranquility. That means is to put their domestic affairs in order; send home their British troops, erect themselves into convenient sized states, remodel their laws, frame and adopt consitutions Republican in form, and apply to be incorporated into the American Union!" The prospect was bright for an arch-expansionist to contemplate.

The suggestion of Medill that the Canadians apply for admission into the American Union was an outgrowth of a maneuver of the extreme Republicans to pacify a disgruntled portion of the electorate. In the spring, as has been shown above, despite the efforts of the colonials and interested Yankees to the contrary, reciprocal trade with the British Provinces had been summarily ended. Aware that their action had probably alienated many votes amongst the commercial and industrial classes of New

1. The Chicago Tribune, September 21, 1866.

York and New England as well as among many western farmers, the radicals led by N. P. Banks, sought to attract these alienated voters by putting forth another scheme for continuing reciprocity. Without preface or prelude to indicate that the gesture was contemplated, and while excitement over the Fenian raid into Canada remained at a high pitch, Mr. Banks, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, introduced into the House a bill providing for the annexation of the British North American Provinces to the United States. The bill, however, was really the work of James Wickes Taylor, who had been appointed to study that problem after Congress had terminated reciprocity.

Mr. Taylor was well qualified to perform the task, for during the past few years, while he was a Special Agent of the Treasury Department assigned to duty in Minnesota, he had interested himself in the British Provinces, their problems and particularly reciprocity. Many prominent Provincials were his friends.¹ His report to the Department, indicates thoroughness from start to finish. The earlier pages of it are devoted to a detailed analysis of the resources of the British Provinces and statistical data which deal with the workings of the Reciprocity Treaty. Having concluded such an analysis and presentation of data, Taylor had really completed the task assigned him. But with unexpired zeal, he tacked on to his report a plan for the annexation of Her Majesty's colonies in North America. Taylor prefaced the twelve articles which embodied his plan with a statement amazing in view of the facts contained in the earlier part of

1. Among these were C. J. Brydges, Isaac Buchanan and Joseph Howe.

his report.¹ He wrote, "I cannot resist the conclusion that events have presented to the people and government of the United States the opportunity -- let me rather say, -- have devolved the duty -- of interposing by an overture to the people of the English colonies on this continent, of course upon the fullest consultation with the government of Great Britain, to unite their fortunes with the people and Government of the United States."² The plan provided for the assumption of the public debt of the Provincials by the Federal government which was also to take over the light-houses, customs offices and depots, post-offices, public lands and control of canals, navigable streams and harbors; in short all of those things which the United States government controlled in the States. For relinquishment of title to these items the Provinces were to be paid slightly more than

1. Even a superficial study of the facts as Taylor presented them leads one to the conclusion that the Reciprocity Treaty had been of great benefit to both the Canadians and the citizens in the northern tier of States. In this his report agrees with that of E. H. Derby and those of two provincials who studied the problem at the same time. Why Taylor should have concluded his report with the 'annexation scheme' is an extremely puzzling problem, for which I would hesitate to offer a solution. In all the letters Taylor received and preserved from Canadians in this period, there is but one which can be interpreted as leading him to believe that the Canadians were in any mood to receive his proposals kindly. This letter, Buchanon to Taylor, February 24, 1866 is vague in the extreme, referring to propositions talked over at Buchanon's home shortly after the Detroit Commercial Convention. Joseph Howe was 'enamored of' Taylor's scheme. How far he influenced Taylor is difficult to determine. He might have encouraged Taylor to draft the bill. If it could be shown that Howe was anxious to bring on an 'imperial issue' which I think likely, Taylor's proposals would have furthered his end. Taylor, Howe and Buchanon had some project underway in the spring of 1866. Its nature, however, can not be determined from the evidence now available. I have been unable to determine whether or not there are any Isaac Buchanon manuscripts in existence.

2. Taylor, James W., Report on Commercial Relations with British America, House Executive Document, 39th, 1st, No. 128 (Serial No. 1263)

eighty-five million dollars in a lump sum; and more than a million and a half was to be given them annually in aid of local expenditures. The Federal government was to guarantee an immediate expenditure of upwards of fifty millions of dollars for the improvement of Canadian canals, rivers and harbors and was to build, in the near future, a railroad through Selkirk settlement and Prince Rupert's land to the Pacific. Taylor even provided for the number of representatives each Province was to send to the House. Lest all of the Provinces should not fall in with his scheme he provided for single admissions.

As Congress considered the report, Major General Banks won 'his place in the sun' as far as the Canadians were concerned, by recommending to Congress that it enact Taylor's annexation proposal into law, and create thereby an enabling act of which the British colonials could avail themselves as circumstance might dictate. Congress paid its chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee the compliment of hearing his bill through a first and second reading, and ordered it to be engrossed. Then it was recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs where it passed into the limbo of such legislation.¹ General Banks had accomplished his purpose, for the press, quick to realize the political potentialities of the measure gave it nation-wide publicity.

1. The Congressional Globe, 39th, 1st, IV, 3548. Blegen, T. C., A Plan for the Union of British North America and the United States, 1866, in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, IV, 470 ff, treats the Taylor-Banks proposal as an outgrowth of reciprocity. I agree with this interpretation only partially, for as will be subsequently shown, I think it more important as a political maneuver than as an integral part of the economic policy of the Republicans.

The editor of the Chicago Tribune boasted that "the entire measure, originally advocated last fall in the columns of the Chicago Tribune, will attract the attention not only of the American, Canadian and British Governments and people, but of the entire diplomatic and civilized world. It is a new invention in diplomacy -- a new lesson in state-craft -- a new mode of conquest. When ruder barbarian empires like Rome and Great Britain have proposed to extend their boundaries, they have marched forward their armies and drenched their conquests in blood. We quietly offer to pay their debts, run their state governments, build a few thousand miles of railroads and canals for them, open their lakes to the ocean and give them our free trade, and then say, 'come in now if you choose, if not, wait until you get ready.' This is a capital bill! We hope it will pass."¹ Another of the extreme Republican organs believed that "when the Canadians are thoroughly released from the sentimental superstitions which now form the only bond or basis of the British connection, the pressure of their material interests will soon drive them to the door which Congress is about to open for their reception."² The editor might have added that Congress in the spring had taken in hand the matter of the Canadians' 'material interests.' A strictly Democratic journal objected to the liberality of the Taylor-Banks proposal, though it agreed with its Republican rivals in the main as to the desirability of expansion. The political significance of the proposed measure captured the

1. The Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1866.

2. The St. Paul Press, July 7, 1866.

attention of this organ. "The object of Banks is apparent," it observed. "He is endeavoring to steal a march on the democracy. He thinks that the Canadians, inspired with gratitude for permission to enter the great American Union, will naturally endeavor to express their thanks by voting his, the abolition, ticket."¹ The New York Herald dwelt on yet another angle of the political significance of the proposed measure. "We perceive in it the outlines if not the reality of a project long entertained by the dominant political power. The restoration of the Southern States and their representation in Congress the Republicans are aware cannot be much longer delayed. In that event the balance of power they fear will be against them, and to remedy that difficulty they propose to annex Canada and carve it up into whatever number of States may be necessary to enable them to retain the political preponderance."² The only really hostile comment to the proposal emanated from the Buffalo Advertiser of July 10th. "The whole thing," it insisted, "is about as ridiculous a piece of proposed impudence as could well have been conceived, and will doubtless be received by our provincial neighbors with the derision which it deserves." The Buffalo Advertiser anticipated correctly the reaction of the Canadian press. After a thorough analysis and scathing denunciation of the whole scheme, George Brown concluded the editorial comment in his Toronto Globe: "As it is, we can afford to laugh at Mr. Taylor for preparing, and Congress for using, such a superlatively foolish bit of political

1. The Chicago Times, Late July, 1866, Taylor's Scrap Book.
2. The New York Herald, July 8, 1866.

romancing. Mr. Taylor might next try his hand on a plan for the annexation of the moon."¹ The other Canadian journals for once followed Brown's lead. All voiced opposition to coerced annexation.

How far the radical Republican policy of truckling to the Fenians and bidding for the votes of those who wished expansion for other reasons furthered the triumph of the party in the autumn elections can not be determined. A bit of positive evidence, here and there, tends to indicate that espousal of the Fenian cause aided the party. Early returns from Maine and Vermont showed that the Irish voter was going over to the extreme Republican ranks.² This alarmed the administration followers. Senator Dixon wrote: "We certainly lost many of their (the Fenian) votes in Maine & should today in this state (Conn.). There is no doubt of this. I think we shall feel it in Pennsylvania & New York."³ To prevent further loss of the Irish vote, President Johnson at the behest of the Democrats, particularly Mr. Tilden, directed that prosecution of Fenians in the custody of the United States be dropped, and ordered the return to the Irish Republic of the arms and other munitions of war seized during the June raid.⁴ Simultaneously, the administration was tireless in its

1. The Toronto Globe, July 11, 1866.

2. Joseph Howe and William Annand to the Earl of Carnarvon, Oct. 3, 1866, Howe Mss., IX, 177 ff.

3. J. Dixon to G. Welles, Sept. 29, 1866, Welles Mss., LXII, quoted in Beale, Op. Cit., 304.

4. Beale, Op. Cit., 304. The editors of the New York World and the Detroit Free Press observed that the policy pursued by Johnson and the Democrats in the late summer and early autumn checked the swing of Irish votes to the Republican party. The New York World, August 5, 1866; The Detroit Free Press, Aug. 21, 23, Oct. 6 & 16, 1866.

efforts to secure the release of some of the Fenians still in Canadian custody and endeavored to obtain leniency for others. To be sure, this is negative evidence; but it does not seem unreasonable to contend that the espousal of Fenian expansion gained votes for the Republicans. Similarly, since the West continued to show interest in expansion, as will appear later, it is reasonable to suppose that the Taylor-Banks proposal brought into the Republican column many votes which otherwise might not have been recorded there. However, no matter what the effect upon the elections, expansion had been kept in the forefront of political discussion and the Republicans had given additional proof that they believed in 'Manifest Destiny.'

A glance backward reveals the intensity with which expansion had been pursued. In the autumn of 1864 and throughout the spring of 1865, Stanton, Butler, Chandler and Henry Winter Davis, to enumerate only conspicuous figures in public office, had shown unmistakable signs of a willingness to lead their party into a war with Great Britain for the conquest of Canada. During the next year practically every leading member of the Republican party, not to mention a dozen or two lesser lights, had acquiesced in the adoption of a commercial policy avowedly designed to force the British colonials in North America to sue for annexation to the United States. In the adoption of such a policy, Congress made a beginning towards the assumption of the direction of foreign policy, constitutional prohibitions to the contrary notwithstanding. Before the new policy had existed long enough to demonstrate either its effectiveness or its weakness, the Fenians

had become a force to be considered in American politics. Reckoning with them, the radical leaders again endorsed expansion and a second time served notice that the party desired through its congressional leaders to assume direction of the foreign policy. The Taylor-Banks episode only furnishes additional proof of the radicals' attitude towards Canadian absorption and the control of foreign affairs. The record of the party was not yet complete; further attempts at expansion were shortly to follow. But the policy had developed sufficiently to give the British colonials food for thought and impulse for action. Joseph Howe, who had watched closely the unfolding of the Republican program from its early budding, believed that there was danger ahead. He wrote Lord Stanley that in the light of the recent policies pursued by the Republicans "there is manifestly great danger of a rupture with the United States should the autumn elections strengthen the hands of the Republican party and weaken those of the President and Mr. Seward."¹ No doubt Mr. Howe had failed to perceive that the Republican maneuvers of the past two years were primarily intended to preserve the supremacy of the party in domestic affairs. Should the domestic program go awry, because of unforeseen circumstances, the foreign policy might be pursued to fruition. The British, observing the political trend in the United States and conscious of the appeal which 'Manifest Destiny' made to the average American, were already moving to meet any emergency which might arise.

1. Howe to Lord Stanley, Aug. 17, 1866, Howe Mss., IX, 82 ff.

Chapter IV

'THE KINGDOM OF CANADA' AND 'MANIFEST DESTINY.'

The schemes of the Republican expansionists to realize 'Manifest Destiny,' which gained nation-wide importance during the campaign of 1866, gave impetus to the British and Provincial plans for preserving the North American colonies as a part of the Empire. The largest item in the protective program was the plan to federate the four colonies immediately adjacent to the United States. The project had taken concrete form when it seemed to responsible colonials and interested parties at home that the American Civil War might terminate in an attempted conquest of Canada. At this time, when all was uncertainty in Anglo-American relations, delegates from Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island met at Quebec and agreed upon seventy-two resolutions as the basis of federation. The Quebec Resolutions, as these came to be called, were shortly thereafter presented to the imperial parliament for enactment into law. Before the imperial legislative body, which always moved slowly when dealing with colonial affairs, could act, two of the colonies repudiated the colonial governments responsible for committing them to the federation program. This was not to the liking of the home government and immediately by means of governmental patronage, steps were taken to bring the recalcitrant colonials into line once more. In the Spring of 1866, these efforts were gradually overcoming the opposition.¹

1. Trotter, Canadian Federation treats comprehensively this phase of the federation movement, 123 ff.

Simultaneously, south of the Canadian border, a major political group, for a third time within two years, indicated that it was interested in annexing the British Provinces to the United States.

The interested colonials in New Brunswick seized the opportunity furnished by the threatening attitude of the extreme-Republicans in the United States, to press for confederation. Geographically, that province occupied a key position similar to that held by Georgia in the secession movement in the United States of 1860-'61. Hence the success of confederation depended much upon the attitude of the New Brunswickers. There, the anti-federationists played into the hands of S. L. Tilley, leader of the federation forces. Tilley reported that the 'antis' had hinted that they would "receive substantial aid from the United States"¹ to combat confederation. At the time, Fenians were gathering upon the frontier to carry through their threatened raid. This generally alarmed the border people and "counteracted to some extent the cry got up by Smith and his associates."² Governor Gordon used the volunteer militia, which had been called out to protect the colony, to good advantage. The volunteers were favorable to federation and Gordon was careful to station them, during the elections, at politically strategic points.³ Thus it was that the government of New Brunswick and the federationists of that province used a movement which was

1. S. L. Tilley to MacDonald, April 17, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Confederation VI, 254.

2. Id. to Id., April 20, Ibid., 272. Anton J. Smith was leader of the anti-confederationists.

3. Trotter, Op. Cit., 129.

intended by the Fenians as the beginning of the disruption of the British Empire to confederationist advantage, for the elections of May and June, 1866, returned a colonial legislature overwhelmingly in favor of federation.

The task of the Canadian government, unlike that in New Brunswick, was not one of overcoming opposition to confederation. There, the politicians of both Upper and Lower-Canada had steadfastly supported federation. This does not mean, however, that Lord Monck's task of preserving loyalty to the empire was not a difficult one during the summer and autumn of 1866. Since late 1864, Canada especially had suffered from the policy pursued by the dominant political party in the United States. The St. Albans raid had been conceived on and projected from Canadian soil. Confederate sympathizers had been asyllummed there throughout the internecine struggle, and the Canadians, it was alleged without any real basis in fact, were the virtual allies of the Confederacy. Threats to punish them for these acts unfriendly to the United States had continued until the Fenians, by their raid on Fort Erie, focused attention on their project. When the incursion of the Irish had been repulsed, the continued threats of the Brotherhood to try conclusions with the Canadians once more before winter set in and the friendly interest evinced in this project by leading politicians of the United States, furnished additional proof of animosity to the Canadians. To protect the colony from apprehended danger, of imperial rather than colonial origin, thousands of young Canadians had been called in to active military service and away from their normal peace-time

occupations. This state of affairs, though it contributed somewhat to patriotic ardor, made for social unrest. So also did the fact that commercial activities were adjusting themselves to new channels due to the interruption of reciprocity with the United States. The extent to which the unrest had developed and the apprehensive attitude of the Canadians is attested by an abundant evidence. A close friend of the Canadian premier wrote him that "the state of the public mind ... is one of great uneasiness and uncertainty. ... I firmly believe that for one man whom you could have found a year since, you will now find thousands who will say -- Much better for us to be annexed than to remain in our present unsafe position. ... I am convinced that we are rapidly approaching a crisis, which will require not only all the energies but the wisest minds among us to steer through with safety and honour."¹ Similar expressions of concern emanated from Mr. Vankoughnet, chancellor of West Canada, the Anglican bishop of Toronto and the two chief justices of Upper-Canada.² Moreover, the mere existence of the Taylor-Banks proposal, which was obviously designed to capture American votes, but which was nevertheless capable of attracting the attention of restless Canadians, was sufficient to alarm the Canadian government.

Adopting a policy similar to that which he had pursued during the tension in Canadian-American relations over the St. Albans incident, Lord Monck met the new crisis. He permanently

1. Wm. M. Wilson to MacDonald, Aug. 27, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian III, 845, ff.

2. Monck to Carnarvon, Aug. 27, 1866, G-466, 44 ff.

stationed contingents of Canadian volunteers and British regulars at vital points along the frontier. Such encampments, he hoped, would serve a double purpose. They would discourage further incursions into Canada by filibusters from the United States and at the same time encourage the growth of a sense of security amongst Canadians.¹ In a like manner, he disposed of that portion of the British fleet assigned to duty in North American waters.² Further, he attempted to minimize colonial fears by assuring his intimates that he believed that the United States would fulfill all of its international obligations. He exerted himself to restrain the enraged provincials from dealing summarily with the Fenians apprehended during the June raids.³ In this way, he sought to please the Washington government and to check the growth of increasing animosity south of the border. By late August, Monck and his advisors feeling that their efforts to alleviate the restlessness prevalent in Canada had come to naught, telegraphed the Home Government: "Have consulted Michel -- we think looking to continued preparations of the Fenians, the uneasy feeling in Canada, and the peculiar political complications in the States, that a reinforcement of regular troops should at once be sent out."⁴

1. Monck to Carnarvon, Aug. 27, 1866, G-466, 44 ff.

2. Monck to Cardwell, July 10, 1866, G-466, 2 ff; Monck to Carnarvon, Aug. 2, 1866, Aug. 16, 1866, G-466, 14 & 33 ff.

3. This action was probably taken at the behest of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Cardwell to Monck, June 30, 1866, G-176, 95; Bruce to Monck, July 18, 1866, G-237, 130 ff; Monck to Carnarvon, July 21, 1866, G-466, 8 ff.

4. Specific request was made for "three regiments of infantry, two batteries of field artillery, one regiment of cavalry with horses to arrive not later than September twentieth." Monck to Carnarvon, Aug. 26, 1866, G-176, 307. Why Lord Monck should have requested an additional imperial force when that which he

The call of the Governor General of Canada for assistance met with ready response, for the moment was opportune. In June, due entirely to domestic circumstances, a conservative government under the leadership of Lord Derby had succeeded to power in Great Britain. This government had a more active imperial interest than the one which it succeeded.¹ The colonial secre-

had in Canada was adequate to deal with the Fenians, is puzzling. He may have anticipated invasion from the United States by a force more formidable than any which the Fenians could muster. The phrase 'peculiar political complications in the States' might be interpreted to mean that he felt that one political party or the other there would assume leadership in conquest. However, always in his despatches home Monck stated that he had complete confidence that the government of the United States would fulfill its international obligations. When the troops which Monck requested arrived, it was alleged by the Canadian press that the government had divulged the fact that the troops had been sent out from England "not so much to guard against Fenian attacks as to be prepared for more serious consequences." The Toronto Leader, Oct. 11, 1866. Moreover, Monck certainly knew that artillery was not a necessary weapon to protect the Canadas from the Fenians. Shortly after the artillery arrived, Generals G. G. Meade and W. T. Sherman, who for some reason were inspecting the 'defenses of Canada' reported, according to the New York Daily Tribune of Dec. 17, 1866 that the new artillery was capable of committing great destruction. I think that an examination of the reports whether official or unofficial which Meade and Sherman sent to Stanton should throw some light on the question of the 'political complications.' It is worth noting in passing that after this new imperial force arrived in Canada, the war-like tone which prominent papers in the United States had always used when discussing Canadian-American relations, disappeared. This is particularly true of Greeley's organ. Perhaps, though I find it hard to believe, the dropping of the war-like tone was only fortuitous.

1. The political over-turn brought to the House of Commons a few members more interested in colonial than domestic policies. Amongst these was Sir Edward Watkin, who had concerned himself with colonial affairs since the late fifties. He was ready to give the colonials every possible assistance to prevent their absorption by the United States. His recorded reaction to the Taylor-Banks Bill is probably typical of the group of 'empire-builders' of which he was one. He wrote of the bill, "The only excuse -- an excuse far from valid for so monstrous a proposal -- was that no one knew what the British Government were inclined to do; and at Washington no one believed that John Bull would

tary, Lord Carnarvon, though willing to accept Lord Monck's repeated pronouncements that he had confidence in the government of the United States "had grave misgivings on this point."¹ He exerted himself therefore to provide adequate defense for the colony. As a result of his activity and the hearty cooperation of his colleagues, an additional imperial military force reached Canada late in September. The imperial troops, Lord Monck reported, soon restored the confidence of the Canadians in the Home Government by removing the fear of Fenian attack.² Monck and his colonial advisors, however, realized that the position of the colony was none too secure though the provincial defenses, for the moment, were in order. Consequently, as soon as the in-

'make a fight of it;' while everyone knew that if a similar Bill, with the object of enabling the Southern States to come under the dominion of the Queen, had been introduced into the British House of Commons, the United States Ambassador 'to the Court of St. James' would have been recalled -- to begin with. The British Ambassador took no notice, made no remonstrance; but the advent of Mr. Disraeli to power discouraged such outrages, and led in the following year to the passing of the Act for Confederation. In printing this Bill, my object is to show the mischief, mischief which a half-a-dozen times in my life time has placed before my countrymen the alternative of ignominious concessions of war between English-speaking people, or 'uncertain sounds.' It is essential to continued peace, trade and prosperity, that it should be known to all the world that the broad lands between the two great oceans are an integral part of the Empire; that they will never be parted with without a struggle, in which all our forces will be amply used; and that either invasion, or the insidious agitation which from time to time is hatched in the United States with an eye to rebellion, will be put down by force. Here is this insulting document printed verbatim. I challenge the quotation of any similar outrage on the part of any civilized nation at peace with the Empire attacked." Watkin, Canada and the States, 227 ff. Cf. also, Trotter, Canadian Federation, 143 ff., which carefully traces the influence of the 'empire-builders' on Canadian confederation.

1. Carnarvon to Monck, Sept. 12, 1866, G-177, 29 ff.

2. Monck to Carnarvon, Sept. 26, 1866, G-466, 82 ff.

clement weather of the late autumn precluded invasion of the Province, they set off for London to cooperate with delegates from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia to press the Home Government to enact enabling legislation to complete federation. This they secured in March, 1867, by the enactment of the British North America Act, which placed the colonies in a better position to resist possible absorption by the United States.

While the colonial delegates and the Derby government in England struggled with the details of the legislation which federated the North American Provinces, the whole question of the northward expansion of the United States languished. Throughout the early winter months, the dailies ignored the subject as pronouncedly as they had preached it during the previous summer and autumn. To be sure in early December, rumors were abroad that the dominant political party would push to further extremes the foreign policy which they had pursued since late 1864. It was hinted that the 'so-called bonded system' which regulated shipment of commodities through Canada and the northern tier of American states, to the mutual advantage of both, would be upset, as soon as Congress convened. C. J. Brydges of the Grand Trunk Railway anticipated that the extreme Republicans would follow up the advantage which reciprocity repeal gave their expansion program, with this maneuver.¹ If expansion had been uppermost in the minds of the Republican radicals, the step would not have been amiss, for it would have indubitably contributed to increased dullness in trade in the Canadas and probably in seeking

1. A. Campbell to MacDonald, Dec. 10, 1866, MacDonald Mss., Fenian III, 1122.

a remedy annexation sentiment would have been strengthened. Likewise, it would have been to the advantage of the expansionist party to repeal the Neutrality Laws. This it had virtually promised to do for the Fenians. All that was necessary to complete repeal was to secure the adherence of the Senate to the bill which the House had passed during the last session of Congress. Charles Sumner, better schooled in foreign policy than some of his colleagues, anticipated that rigorous steps would have to be taken to prevent repeal. In fact he was so perturbed concerning the prospect that he wrote George Bemis asking how to avert such a catastrophe.¹ Sumner might have spared his ink and Bemis been saved the trouble of suggesting that Banks' measure be killed in committee, for Thaddeus Stevens, the Republican manager of the House, brooked no interference with his plans. Consequently, though the Democrats made an abortive effort to turn the attention of the Republicans away from internal issues to foreign complications,² these were ignored as Stevens and his following turned to the settling of domestic scores.

When the news arrived from England that legislative provision for the federation of the British Provinces had been enacted by Parliament, interest in the affairs of its northern neighbor

1. Bemis to Sumner, Dec. 13, 1866, Sumner Mss., LXXIX, 79.

2. Andrew J. Rogers, Democrat, Representative from New Jersey, introduced a bill calling for the repeal of the Neutrality Laws on December 10th. It was heard through a first and second reading, ordered to be printed, and referred to the judiciary committee. It was reported out of committee on Dec. 11th and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Its Chairman, N. P. Banks, who had been most active in behalf of the repeal of the Neutrality Laws in the 1st Session of the 39th Congress, failed to report the bill out of committee during the remainder of the session. Congressional Globe, 39th, 2nd, I, 47 & 68.

revived in the United States. The Detroit Free Press on Feb. 27, 1867, deprecated the fact that the new federation was to be vested with the title of 'The Kingdom of Canada,' for that would only add, it believed, to the friction already existing between the British and certain elements of the American body politic.¹ The same day, Henry J. Raymond, erstwhile editor of the New York Times, drew the attention of Congress to the creation on the North American continent of a new nation. He wished to know if the President had remonstrated against or given permission for this violation of the Monroe Doctrine.² The party to which Raymond nominally belonged failed to discuss the questions raised by his resolution, though some of the members wished to hear it debated.³ The city dailies, which had previously shown a decided

1. The Toronto Globe claimed to have in advance of all of its rivals a copy of the bill which created the Dominion of Canada. The Globe claimed that the new federation was to be called 'The Kingdom of Canada.' This title had been suggested, but Lord Stanley, secretary of state for foreign affairs, in the Derby Government, stated that such designation of the new confederation would give umbrage to the United States; so the milder title of Dominion was adopted.

2. It is probable that Secretary of State Seward, a close personal friend of Raymond, may have asked him to introduce the resolution which apprized Congress of the situation, so that any protest which the Secretary might wish to make to the government of Great Britain would seem the stronger for having congressional support. Raymond, of course, may have secured his information concerning the supposed enactment of the British North America Act from the same source as the Detroit Free Press, i. e., the Toronto Globe. This is not likely, however, for this is the only instance upon which Raymond had shown interest in either Canadian or Anglo-American relations.

3. The Congressional Globe, 39th, 2nd, III, 1617 & 1646. The radicals may have refused to discuss Raymond's resolution either because the pressure of business at the close of the session would not permit or because failure to do so would further discipline Raymond, who was in ill-favor for remaining loyal to Johnson. Either or both are plausible explanations of the party's action; but it seems likely that the latter is the more so for shortly the questions raised by Raymond were fully discussed.

interest in expansion, taking their cue from Congress commented, if at all, only mildly on the turn provincial affairs had taken. Horace Greeley completely ignored the creation of the Canadian Dominion. The New York Herald observed that it doubted whether the United States had any right to interfere with "the transplantation of a shoot of the British monarchy to American soil."¹ Joseph Medill pointed out editorially in his Chicago Tribune that political confederation would not prove of material benefit to the provincials -- only inevitable annexation could accomplish this. The following day he scored Mr. Raymond soundly for "making a personal bid for popularity by shaking his fist at the British lion."² When it was manifest that neither the radicals in Congress nor the journals which circulated their every utterance were going to vaunt their expansionist notions and mutter splenetically at an additional British act unfriendly to the United States, the Detroit Free Press observed sarcastically that "the 'rump' was only waiting for the next session of Congress to get underway to protest in the name of Columbia against an act which seems rather inconsistent with our national and historical traditions."³

The prophecy of the Detroit Free Press that the members of the extreme Republican party would protest against the confederation of the British Provinces as soon as the members of the Congress elected in the autumn of 1866 assembled, was shortly ful-

1. The New York Herald, February 28, 1867.

2. The Chicago Tribune, February 28, and March 1, 1867.

3. March 2, 1867.

filled. This Congress, the Fortieth, convened in a special session on the fourth of March, 1867. On the 8th, before the question of Canadian federation had grown cold, General N. P. Banks drew the attention of the House to it by reading a memorial adopted by the Maine Legislature requesting the United States to "interpose its legitimate influence in friendly and earnest remonstrance with the British Government against establishing any system of government in North America the influence of which would endanger the friendly relations of the people of the British Provinces with the people of the United States."¹ A fortnight later, the New England general secured the adoption of two resolutions which indicated that the Republican legislators had not forsaken the desire to direct the nation's foreign relations. The first of these resolutions stated that "the United States can not regard the proposed confederation of the Provinces on the northern frontier without extreme solicitude."² The second extended sympathy to the Irish people in their struggle to gain republican institutions. On March 13th, sandwiched in between his action in publishing the memorial of the Maine Legislature and the adoption of the two resolutions, the 'Hero of Red River' as the Detroit Free Press frequently called General Banks, reintroduced his bill to repeal the Neutrality Laws. It was heard through the first and second reading, ordered engrossed and recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of which its author was chairman.³ Meantime in the Senate, Simon Cameron of

1. The Congressional Globe, 40th, 1st, 37.

2. Ibid., 392.

3. Ibid., 92.

Pennsylvania, newly arrived in the ranks of those interested in foreign relations, called upon the Committee on Foreign Affairs by resolution to ascertain the facts concerning the establishment of a new nation on the American continent to threaten "the traditional policy of the fathers and founders of the Republic."¹ This -- as Mr. Eldridge had mentioned in the House, at a time when Congress had imposed despotic military rule upon ten of the southern states.² Cameron's colleague, Chandler from Michigan introduced a bill which authorized the sale of ships to any belligerent people. Its adoption, as Sumner, Fessenden, Conness and Reverdy Johnson carefully indicated would have virtually repealed the Neutrality Laws. In the discussion of the measure, Chandler disclosed his motive for introducing the bill. He said, "Sir, this North American continent has not land enough for an Empire or even a viceroyalty. The United States of America needs all the land on the continent of North America and the time will come, at no distant day, when she will own it all. But, sir, these British Provinces have gone on year after year consolidating and preparing for a viceroyalty. I ask the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations if any protest against a viceroyalty or the establishment of a kingdom on our northern frontier has ever gone from the Committee on Foreign Relations? ... No, sir, not a word has been heard from the Committee on Foreign Relations on the subject. And, now, when I introduce a

1. Ibid., 48.

2. Ibid., 37 & 38.

purely commercial bill from the Committee on Commerce, forsooth, it will complicate our foreign relations!"¹ The real meaning of the maneuvers of the radicals in the House and Senate is difficult to determine. The press, for once, was strangely and so an acute observer of international affairs thought, ominously silent. This same observer, George Bemis, believed that Banks, Colfax, Jenckes and Stevens in collusion with Wade, Chandler and others in the Senate were planning some coup which would accomplish untold mischief and he warned Senator Sumner to be prepared to counter it.² However, before mischief, if any were contemplated, could be made, the Special Session of the 40th Congress ended and Mr. Seward on the closing day diverted the attention of expansionists momentarily away from the British possessions by announcing the negotiation of a treaty to purchase Russian North America.

The announcement of the proposed purchase, if the press comment is fair criterion on which to base such an assertion, startled the nation. Likewise, as minor evidence indicates, the radicals were surprised and at first showed an inclination to look with disfavor upon an expansion proposal coming from one who had recently repudicated their domestic policy.³ Mr. Seward had probably anticipated that opposition to his 'pet scheme' would emanate from this quarter.⁴ For this reason, if

1. Ibid., 328.

2. George Bemis to Sumner, March 21, 1867, Sumner Mss., LXXXI, 27.

3. J. M. Forbes to Sumner, April 6, 1867, Sumner Mss., LXXXI, 70. "I owe Secy. Seward personally no love, & it might gratify personal animosities everywhere in the Republican party to snub him, but it won't do to carry this personal game too far."

4. Concerning the activity of Mr. Seward in gaining support

for no other, he had invited Senator Sumner, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, to participate in the drafting of the treaty. This Mr. Sumner did and before the work was concluded in the early morning hours of March 30, Mr. Sumner had promised the Russian Minister, Baron de Stoeckl, to see the treaty through its ratification stages.¹ The advantage which had thus been gained was quickly followed up, for on the 1st of April President Johnson convened the Senate in a Special Executive Session and on the 9th the Massachusetts Senator argued the case of the treaty in the only speech of consequence made in its favor.

This speech stamped Senator Sumner as one of the arch-expansionists of the period, for in urging his fellow senators to ratify the treaty he rang the changes on 'Manifest Destiny' as only one of his scholarly attainments could do. First, he traced with meticulous care and examined minutely the history and resources of the region embraced in the proposed purchase. Then, with equal thoroughness he traced the expansion of the Great Republic as it had spread its institutions over the continent. In clinching this argument he stated: "The present treaty is a visible step in the occupation of the whole North American continent. As such it will be recognized by the world and accepted by the American people. But the treaty involves something more. We dismiss one other monarch from the continent. One by

For his measure Welles makes some interesting observations.
Welles, The Diary of, III, 75 & 76.

1. Pierce, E., Works of Charles Sumner, XI, 183.

one they have retired, -- first France, then Spain, then France again, and now Russia, -- all giving way to the absorbing Unity declared in the national motto, E pluribus unum."¹ Moreover, he claimed that the purchase would prevent anticipated acquisition of the territory by Great Britain and make her possessions in the far northwest of the continent useless to her. The argument was a telling one and at its conclusion, despite the fact that Messrs. Morrill and Fessenden of Vermont and Maine respectively, tried to postpone action, the treaty was ratified with only two dissenting votes recorded.

At the first announcement of the completion of Seward's negotiation for the Russian territory, the radical Republican press came out in force against the ratification of the treaty. Greeley fulminated at length against it, holding that the Johnson administration whose policies had failed to meet the domestic crisis was attempting to cover up its shortcomings by diverting attention to foreign problems. He felt that the argument that the acquisition of Russian America would help to force

1. Ibid., 223. Mr. Sumner advanced here an argument which is interesting in the extreme. He prefaced it by quoting from the preface of John Adams' 'Defense of the American Constitutions! "Thirteen governments thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, without a pretense of miracle or mystery, and which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind." That Mr. Sumner had not arrived at the sentiment set forth in the text above and did not use the quotation from the pen of John Adams as arguments seized hastily to suit the particular needs of the occasion is apparent from a letter written to his friend Francis Lieber the previous autumn. In this letter, after quoting the passage from Adams he said: "I have always thought this a striking passage but it appears that it is the inscription of the Treasury seal done into English." Oct. 8, 1866, Sumner Mss., Letters and Papers to Correspondents.

Britain off of the North American continent was palpably absurd.¹ He suggested that if we desired a quarrel with Great Britain we could find a pretext any day without going to the northern Pacific. As had already been shown, Sumner, in his speech in Executive Session, had used with much force the argument that the purchase would be a masterful stroke against Britain and her power on this continent. As soon as the statements of the eminent New Englander became public property, the Republican press remained discreetly silent. From thence on during the protracted discussion of the purchase, for it must be remembered that the matter was not considered by the House and the funds to complete the purchase were not provided until July, 1868, prominent Republican leaders dwelt on the desirability of ridding the continent of another monarchy -- of striking at much hated 'John Bull' through the purchase of Russian America. This was the keystone of their arch of defense for becoming parties to a bad bargain.² Of course a discussion of the ultimate fate of the lately confederated British Provinces in North America was not at all germane to the question of the desirability of the proposed purchase. However, the purchase was urged by some as a

1. The New York Daily Tribune, April 1, 1867.

2. "I have felt that after reconstruction is settled we must have some grand idea in the center of our political policy. What can be better than the gradual extension of our Republican system over the whole continent. We must be in no hurry. The fruit will ripen in due time. All we have to do is to resolve to take it up as it falls. What so many seem to have foreseen we may undertake to realize." John Sherman to Sumner, September 6, 1867, Sumner Mss., LXXXIII, 103. Cf. also, George Bancroft to Sumner, June 15, 1867, Ibid., XLIX, 149. Speeches of Messrs. Mungen, Myers, Banks, Roum, Spalding and Orth in the House of Representatives, July 1 to 7, 1868, Congressional Globe, 40th, 2nd, IV, 3659, 3660, 3662, 3813, 3810, & Appendix, 385 & 431.

counter-stroke to Canadian federation. In fact, the Republican dailies for weeks to come continued to preach the inevitability of the absorption of the British Provinces into the Great Republic.¹ Hopes of expansionists everywhere in the United States were stimulated and the discontented in the Dominion of Canada, for there were those whose political aspirations had been thwarted by the erection of the Dominion, were attracted by the agitation of annexation to the United States.² Soon the Republicans were to seize the opportunity furnished by this discontent in the Canadian Dominion to vaunt annexation to the United States as a cure for all political, economic and social ills. Many of the radicals saw an opportunity now by working with these discontented factions to realize 'Manifest Destiny.'

1. The New York Daily Tribune, May 10 and June 26, 1867 and The Chicago Tribune, April 20 and Sept. 21, 1867.

2. A sentiment for annexation had been growing in British Columbia and Nova Scotia. These movements are to be studied subsequently.

Chapter V.

Conclusion.

Between the inception and conclusion of the movement traced in the foregoing pages, many members of the Republican party, which dominated the government of the United States throughout the period, expressed a desire to extend the boundaries of the United States. Overwhelmingly these expressions focus the attention of any reader upon the possibility of absorbing all or a portion of British North America. Also, these sentiments emanated -- with one major exception, William H. Seward -- from the radical wing of the party. Quite logically then, it might be concluded that this group was vitally interested in expansion as such. But this was not the case, for if the acts of these men are placed in the perspective of the politics of the day, as has been attempted above, the wary reader is not led to that conclusion. A rapid review, moreover, of the salient features of the movement will probably more readily reveal the truth of this statement.

The first full-throated cry of the extremists for expansion was a call to arms for conquest. It was the typical shout of a people with a highly developed war-psychosis. Into it was crammed a deep and abiding hatred for Great Britain, a consciousness of military strength, and a frantic desire to use the latter to strike the British at a vulnerable point. Only a minority of the radicals contributed to the uproar; but they attracted to their support two of the more powerful dailies

of the nation. From this moment until the end of the movement, these journals -- the Chicago and New York Tribunes -- vigorously supported expansion. In last analysis, these newspapers kept before the masses cogent arguments for depriving Great Britain of her North American Provinces, published every utterance of the radicals concerning the advisability of conquering or annexing them and, infrequently, urged the radicals forward by suggestive editorials. The action of the newspapers and radicals was obviously inspired by the popularity which accrued to those who bearded the 'British Lion,' as a considerable body of evidence indicates. Additional evidence is not wanting to show that part of the radicals were interested in furthering their fortunes with local constituents by urging public improvements on the basis of military necessity. Others took this opportunity to launch a drive to take the direction of foreign affairs away from the executive. It is likely, too, that these men perceived that the Civil War was soon to end, diminishing their power and prestige with its collapse, and as a consequence, were shouting for conquest to perpetuate their power. Thus from the start, the radicals were making the idea of absorbing British North America serve diverse ends.

As 1865 wore on, and the possibilities of war with Great Britain and the threatened conquest of Canada daily diminished, the radicals, few of whom had been privy to the negotiation of the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada in 1854, urged that its repeal would be speedily followed by the absorption of all of British North America. It is quite clear that a spirit of

'revanche' and an ardent desire of selfish interests -- industrial, mining and lumbering -- to end a treaty which worked hardship on them but which served the nation as a whole advantageously, guided the oratory of the extremists. Equally obvious, particularly so after the Detroit Commercial Convention, was the fact that the commercial interests, in totality, were opposed to the cancellation of the Reciprocity Treaty. This placed the Republican extremists in a perplexing predicament; the support of the industrial, mining and lumbering interests, which desired repeal of the treaty, and of the commercial group which did not, were necessary adjuncts to the continuance of the Republican supremacy. Annexation was, at this juncture, brought forward to serve as a palliative for reconciling those interests which deprecated repeal and as the principal excuse for urging it. When the Canadians attempted to meet every reasonable objection of the Republicans either to continue reciprocity or to renew it in a modified form, the radicals trotted forth with a regularity which became monotonous, the idea that the ultimate end of the congressional economic policy towards Canada was to force that Province to seek annexation. At the same time these men served notice on the executive that their desires must be duly considered in the adoption of any commercial policy with a foreign power. Also, it must be remembered, that as yet no decision as to whether or not the southerners would be permitted once more to enjoy an immediate and full participation in government had been reached. That their return would probably terminate the domination of the

national government by the Republicans these radicals did not doubt. Similarly they perceived that the economic policy which they advocated might be defeated if the southerners had a hand in its direction. An abundant and trustworthy evidence indicates that the radicals between January and May, 1866 were as vitally interested in the annexation of Canada as they were ever to be. This evidence, however, leaves much to be desired, for it contains no hint as to the motives for wishing annexation. Such being the case, it may not be unreasonable to suggest that the threatened annexation of Canada was serving a three-fold purpose -- that of furthering the power of the legislative branch of the government in its efforts to secure direction of the foreign affairs of the nation, that of advancing a protectionist tariff program and that of a political make-weight to offset the power of the southern states should the radicals fail to prevent their return to the Union save on the terms dictated by Sumner and Stevens. Of these, the latter rests only on inference; the others seem to be fairly well substantiated by the action of the extremists.

Early in the summer of 1866 the radicals had fresh cause for supporting schemes looking to the absorption of Canada. By this time, the predominant political issue before the nation was whether the program of the radicals or that of President Johnson was to prevail in the reconstruction of the southern states. With the national elections of the autumn in the immediate offing, the Johnson party and the radicals each made expedient if unstatesmanlike political shifts to secure the

election of a majority of its congressional candidates so that it might proceed with reconstruction as it pleased. As has been shown in chapter three, the Fenian Brotherhood, believing that it had been encouraged so to act by leaders of each of the political parties, took advantage of the situation, and raided Canada early in June. Thus President Johnson had forced upon him the onerous duty of enforcing the neutrality laws. Meanwhile, the radical Republicans in President Johnson's cabinet, in Congress and throughout the nation, seized the opportunity which this circumstance created to curry favor with the Fenians by encouraging them in their enterprise. By way of showing appreciation of the Brotherhood's schemes, the extremists -- save one, Charles Sumner -- denounced the President for interfering with the Fenians, condemned his management of foreign affairs and gave some additional proof that they wished the control of foreign policy to rest with Congress. Obviously the radical action was designed to attract Irish votes which under normal circumstances they would not have received. That securing support for their candidates, and not encouraging a quasi-military organization to capture Canada for the Republic, was the primary interest of the radicals became even more apparent early in July when one of their number introduced a bill into the House of Representatives which provided for the annexation to the United States of any or all of Her Majesty's Provinces in North America. Political expediency dictated the step, for if nothing else, it indicated that the radicals were closely pursuing the policy which had led them to abrogate the

Reciprocity Treaty some months earlier. In this way voters who had been alienated by the abrogation policy and who did not know the reaction of the Canadians to the bill, were to be reconciled and perhaps cajoled into voting for radical congressional candidates in the autumn. It would be difficult to estimate the extent to which these measures influenced the election. May it suffice to observe, that trustworthy witnesses believed that radical espousal of the Irish cause and threatened annexation of Canada gained supporters for candidates of the extremist party.

Emerging victorious from the elections of 1866, the radicals were afforded two excellent opportunities for pursuing to its logical conclusion the expansionist policy which they had followed since late 1864. One of these they embraced; the other they neglected. In March, 1867 Russia evinced a willingness to withdraw from North America by offering to sell her territory there to the United States. The radicals, at first, hesitated to support their erstwhile leader, William H. Seward, in this step; but when Charles Sumner strengthened Seward's maneuvers by indicating to the radicals as well as to the nation at large, that adopting the Secretary of State's program would prevent Great Britain from acquiring the territory, lesser radicals rallied to the support of the treaty and consummated the purchase at the very time that the British government was erecting its provinces in North America into the Dominion of Canada. If the radical interest in expansion had been primary, they would have taken steps to protest this action of the English.

True, in both the Senate and House of the radical Republican Congress which assembled in Washington on March 5, 1867, the extremists spoke frequently in protest of the British violation of the Monroe Doctrine; but the oratory came to naught for not a single concrete act resulted. At this time the radicals for the most part forsook expansion.

The reasons why expansion ceased to attract attention from the extremists at this point are not far to seek. Indubitably the efforts of the British and the North American colonials to ward off conquest, annexation and absorption prevented the policy being pursued south of the colonial frontier from gaining headway in the Provinces. When the Americans threatened, the English and Provincials met the gesture with preparations for defense and a wise diplomacy. When the Federal government at Washington attempted economic coercion, the colonials made a beginning at breaking-down inter-provincial tariff barriers and sought new markets for colonial products. When the 'Fenian Menace,' encouraged by a friendly attitude in the United States was at its height, the Provinces united and with the assistance of the Imperial government formed the Dominion of Canada. These efficacious measures of the English and their overseas sons coincided in time with changed political conditions in the United States. From the first the Republican radicals had toyed with the notion of expansion as a means to satisfy ends other than that of territorial aggrandisement. As each successive step of the movement unfolded, the program adopted by the extremists was dictated by political expediency

directed to the end of maintaining their political supremacy. Now, secure in their control of the national government the radicals settled down to the task of reconstructing the southern states and the policies of the nation as their fancy dictated.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

OFFICIAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

Colonial Secretary to the Governor General, 1864 - 1871, 10 Volumes and 14 Folios. G-171 to 180 Inc. and G-558 to 569 Inc. The last two folios have no 'G' classification; but are numbered I and II, 1871. They were received by the Dominion of Canada Archives in August, 1929.

Drafts of Letters from Governor Generals to Lt. Governors and Others, 1860 - 1866, G-248, 1 Folio.

Governor General to the Secretary of State, 1864 - 1871, 5 Volumes, G-465 and 466. The last three volumes have been assigned no Dominion Archives classification number. The despatches in these volumes (the last three) commence on July 1, 1867 and extend to December 30, 1872.

Her Majesty's Minister at Washington to the Governor General, 1864 - 1871, 9 Folios, G-232 to 239 Inc. The last folio covering the years 1869 - 1871 Inc. has no G classification. The pages are numbered haphazardly from No. 728 to 2053; there are gaps in the numbering and many unnumbered pages.

Secretary of State to the Lieutenant Governor of Prince Edward Island, 1864 - 1871, 8 Volumes, G-298 to 308.

UNOFFICIAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

Archibald, E. M., Papers. These manuscripts are in the Dominion of Canada Archives. In August, 1929 they had not been filed, classified and catalogued.

The Baring Papers, 1864 - 1871, 10 Folios. There are many divisions to these papers, for all of the correspondence between the 'Houses' in the United States doing business with Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co. were preserved. The correspondence between the principal American agent and the Baring Bros. is all that is embraced in the folios cited. Practically all of the letters were written by Samuel G. Ward but after January 1, 1866, Samuel's brother, George Curtis, contributed a few. The letters from the Barings in reply are in press letter-books but are so badly faded that it is practically impossible to decipher them.

Blair, Austin, Manuscripts. These papers are in the Burton Library, Detroit, Michigan. When they were consulted in September, 1927, they were not filed, classified and catalogued.

Howe Collection, The Papers of Joseph Howe, 89 Volumes. The

collection is in the Dominion of Canada Archives. All volumes were examined but only the following were used in the preparation of this study: Letters to Howe, 1864 - 1873, 1 Vol. Letters to Howe, undated, 1 Vol. Letters from Howe, 1860 - 1872, 2 Volumes. Letters from Howe, undated, 1 Vol. Fishery Commission Correspondence, 2 Volumes. Private Letters, July 1863 to August 17, 1868, 2 Volumes. Newspaper fragments and clippings, 2 Volumes.

MacDonald Collection, The Papers of Sir John A. MacDonald. The collection is in the Dominion of Canada Archives. The collection embraces more than one hundred volumes. The following were used in the preparation of this study: Correspondence regarding Confederation, 1863 - 1874, 6 Vols. Correspondence with the Governor General, 1864 - 1872, 4 Vols. Correspondence regarding Fenian Affairs, 6 Vols. Correspondence regarding Defense, 2 Vols. Correspondence regarding Reciprocity, 1 Vol. Correspondence with C. J. Brydges, 1861 - 1889, 1 Vol. Correspondence with G. E. Cartier, A. T. Galt, T. D. McGee, Sir John Rose and Charles Tupper, 1860 - 1874, 1 Vol. each.

Sumner Manuscripts, The Papers of Charles Sumner, 1864 - 1871, 163 Vols. These papers are in the Harvard University Library. Letters to Sumner, American Correspondence, Vol. 67 to 127. Foreign Correspondence, Vol. 139 to 147. Letters from Everett, Bancroft, Choate and Willis, Vol. 159. Letters to Correspondents, Miscellaneous -- a few to Dr. Francis Lieber, unnumbered.

Taylor Papers, The Manuscripts of James Wickes Taylor, 1864 - 1871. The collection is in the Library of the Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul, Minn.

OFFICIAL PRINTED SOURCES.

The Congressional Globe, 1st Session 38th Congress -- 2nd Session, 40th Congress, Inc., Washington, 1864 ff.

House Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 1st Session, No. 128, (Serial 1263). The materials included in this document concern commercial relations with Great Britain, Washington, 1866.

Malloy, W. M., (Editor), Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776 - 1909, 2 Vols., Washington, 1910.

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. XLIII, Parts 1 & 2 and Series IV, Vol. III, Washington, 1896 & 1900.

Richardson, J. D. (Compiler), Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789 - 1897, Vol. VIII & IX, Washington, 1897.

UNOFFICIAL PRINTED SOURCES.

Diaries, Letters and Memoirs.

Ford, W. C., A Cycle of Adams Letters, 2 Vols., Boston, 1920.

Guedella, P., Gladstone and Palmerston, Being the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851 - 1865, New York, 1928.

Jones, J. B., A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, 2 Vols., Philadelphia, 1866.

MacDonald, A. A., Notes Taken at the Quebec Conference, Canadian Historical Review, Vol. I, 29 ff., Toronto, 1920.

Pierce, E., Charles Sumner: Works, 15 Vols., Boston 1874 - 1883.

Watkin, Sir E. W., Canada and the States -- Recollections, 1851 - 1866, London, 1887.

Welles, G. J., The Diary of Gideon Welles, 3 Vols., New York, 1911.

Newspapers and Pamphlets.

Alison, A. The Independence of Canada, London, 1865.

The Boston Daily Advertiser, March 13, 1865.

The Buffalo Advertiser, July 10, 1866.

The Chicago Times, April 8, 1865.

The Chicago Tribune, 1864 - 1868.

Denison, Major G. T., The Fenian Raid on Fort Erie with An Account of the Battle of Ridgeway, June, 1866, Toronto, 1866.

The Detroit Free Press, December 1, 1864 - June 1, 1871.

Fenian Raid on Fort Erie June the first and second, 1866, with a Map of the Niagara Peninsula, showing the Route of the Troops and a Plan of the Lime Ridge Battle Ground, Toronto, 1866.

Halifax Citizen, February 8, 1868.

The Intercolonial Railway, A National Military Work.

The London Times, October 1, 1864 - June 1, 1865.

The Montreal Gazette, March 13, 1861.

Montreal Trade Review, April 7, 1865.

The New York Daily Tribune, 1864 - 1868.

The New York Herald, 1864 - 1868.

The New York World, August 5, 1866 and February 28, 1867.

Proceedings of the Commercial Convention, Held in Detroit, July 11, 12, 13 & 14, 1865, Detroit, 1865.

The Reciprocity Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain, June 5, 1854. Report of A Special Committee of the Boston Board of Trade, January 2, 1865, Boston, 1865.

Report of a Committee Of The Executive Council and Memo on the Subject of the Renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty of the United States of America, Montreal, 1866.

The St. Paul Daily Press, 1864 - 1868.

Taylor, James W., The Scrap Book of, 3 Vols.

Thoughts on Defense, From a Canadian Point of View, Montreal, 1870.

The Toronto Globe, July 11, 1866.

The Toronto Leader, October 11, 1866.

SECONDARY WORKS.

Allin, C. D. and Jones, G. M., Annexation, Preferential Trade and Reciprocity. An Outline of the Canadian Annexation Movement of 1849 - 1850 With Special Reference to the Question of Preferential Trade and Reciprocity, Toronto, (undated).

Archibald, E. J., The Life and Letters of Sir Edward Mortimer Archibald, Toronto, 1924.

Beale, H. K., The Critical Year, New York, 1930.

Bemis, S. F., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. VII, New York, 1927.

Blegen, T. C., A Plan For The Union of British North America and The United States, 1866, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. IV.

Blegen, T. C., James Wickes Taylor, Minnesota History Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 4, 153 ff., St. Paul, 1915.

Bovey, Wilfred, Confederate Agents in Canada During The American Civil War, Canadian Historical Review, Vol. II, 46 ff., Toronto, 1921.

Callahan, J. M., The Northern Lake Frontier During The Civil War, American Historical Association Annual Report, 1896, Vol. I, 337 ff., Washington, 1897.

Cruikshank, E. A., The Fenian Raid Of 1866, Welland County Historical Society, Papers and Records, Vol. II, 1926, Welland, Canada.

Hardinge, Right Hon. Sir A., The Life of Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 3 Vols., London, 1925.

Haynes, Frederick E., The Reciprocity Treaty With Canada Of 1854, American Economic Ass'n., Publications, VII, 417 ff.

Keenleyside, Hugh L., Canada And The United States, New York, 1929.

MacDonald, Helen G., Canadian Public Opinion On The American Civil War, New York, 1926.

Macdonald, J. A., Troublous Times In Canada, A History of the Fenian Raid of 1866 & 1870, Toronto, 1910.

Nicolay, J. G. & Hay, John, Abraham Lincoln, A History, 10 Vols., New York, 1890.

Tansill, Charles C., The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty Of 1854. John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XL, No. 2., 96 ff., Baltimore, 1922.

Trotter, Reginald G., Canadian Federation, Its Origins and Achievements: A Study In Nation Building, London, 1924.

